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One of the supposed certainties of the common law is 
that persons need not pay for benefits they receive except when 
they have agreed in advance to make payment. The rule takes 
many forms. One of the most familiar is the doctrine that absent 
a contractual obligation, a person benefited by a volunteer 
ordinarily need not pay for what he has received.2 This rule 
supposedly both encourages economic efficiency and respects 
autonomy. 
To illustrate the baseline rule: While I am out of town, 
my neighbor drains his swamp and in the process also dries up 
the mosquito haven in my backyard. I am benefited. 
Nevertheless, common law will probably require me neither to 
shoulder part of the drainage costs, nor to hand over to my 
neighbor any portion of the increase in land value which his 
actions have given me. For me to retain the benefit, and even to 
profit from it willfully, is not "unjust enrichment." Had my 
neighbor desired to have me share the costs or profit with him, 
he should have approached me in advance and sought my 
consent, by contract. 
Yet if a delivery truck hits a bump so that a bag of 
valuable items tumbles out and onto my back yard, the owner 
could compel me to return the bag or pay for it. I will be liable 
even though I had not agreed in advance with the owner that I 
would pay for the items.3 This seems an exception to the basic 
rule that one need not pay for benefits except pursuant to 
contract. 
2 
3 
Restatement of Restitution, section 2 (1937). It is sometimes said that when 
recovery is denied, plaintiffs tend to be called "intenneddlers," but when they 
win, they are more likely to be called "volunteers." Both words refer, 
however, to the same basic pattern: confening benefits on someone who has 
not asked for them. This article uses the terms interchangeably. 
The same puzzle recurs - but is less obvious - when I go into a store. I am 
not free to take whatever I want, even though I have never agreed to the store 
owner's entitlements over his goods. Robert Hale and other legal realists were 
most insistent on this point. For an application of their insights to the realm of 
copyright, see Wendy J. GORDON, "An Inquiry Into The Merits of 
Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent and Encouragement 
Theory'', (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 1343 at 1422-1435 [hereinafter 
W. J. GORDON, "Merits of Copyright'1. 
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The reader is probably objecting that this "exception" is 
no surprise - it is, rather, the familiar category of property. We 
all know that when we "take" others' property, whether we 
actively grab it or passively retain it, we usually have to either 
return it or pay for it. We may even be subject to further 
responsibilities, such as accounting to the owner for profits 
earned by its use. In fact, another supposed baseline rule of the 
common law is that to own property is to have the right to 
exclude "any other individual in the universe" ,4 so that any 
intentional taking of another's personal property, or any 
intentional crossing of a real property boundary, is prima facie 
actionable. Therefore, the reader may argue, there is no 
uncertainty - merely the coexistence of separate established 
categories. 
Yet these two categories, property and liberty, are so 
familiar to us that we often overlook the extent and variability 
with which one limits the other. It was in part to remedy this 
frequent oversight that, shortly after the tum of the last century, 
Wesley Hohfeld developed his now-famous taxonomy of legal 
relations. As Hohfeld explained, "rights" and "duties" are 
logical correlatives, in the sense that if someone has a "right" to 
exclusive use of Blackacre, others must have a "duty" to stay 
off that land. s Similarly, where someone has a "liberty" or 
"privilege" to act, others have (as a logical correlative) "no 
right" to have the government stop the action. 6 So an expansion 
of property "rights" logically entails both an expansion of the 
"duties", and a contraction in the "liberties", of non-owners. 
4 
5 
6 
William BLACKSTONE, Commentaries on the laws of England (facsimile 
ed. 1979)(1765-69), as cited and discussed in Carol M. ROSE, "Canons of 
Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety", (1988) 108 Yale L.J. 601. 
Wesley Newcomb HOHFELD, "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning", (1917) 26 Yale L.J. 710, 746-747. For 
discussion of the intellectual and historical context in which Hohfeld wrote, 
see Joseph William SINGER, "The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical 
Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld", (1982) Wis. L. Rev. 975. For an 
application of the Hohfeldian categories to copyright, see Wendy J. 
GORDON, "Merits ofCopyrighf', loc. cit., note 3, 1354-1378 
W. N. HOHFELD, loc. cit., note 5. 
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"Perhaps that's so," the reader may be conceding, 
"Property can limit non-owners' liberty.7 But that does not 
mean that liberty, in the sense of freedom from nonconsensual 
obligations, is an uncertainty. It just means that liberty 
principles have to be rewritten to take account of this familiar 
exception." For example, the principle with which this essay 
begins could be rewritten to say, "Persons need not pay for 
benefits they receive except when they have in advance agreed 
to pay or when the benefits constitute property owned by 
others." It could further be rewritten to take account of the 
nonconsensual duties imposed by the law of promissory 
estoppel, by tort law, by municipal law, by restitution law, and 
soon. 
Unfortunately for the hope of certainty, the end result is 
a vague statement somewhat like this one: "Persons need not 
pay for benefits they receive except when the law says 
otherwise." Further complicating matters, sometimes the law 
says that property or "quasi-property" arises when one reaps 
where another has sown. s 
The underlying goal of the instant essay is to de-
familiarize the relation of property and liberty so that the reader 
can see it afresh. This journey is one that frequently recurs in 
the legal literature,9 but what this essay adds is a new itinerary. 
It leads the reader away from her accustomed tangible territory 
where fabled Blackacre and Whiteacre abide, into an intangible 
realm sometimes known as Intellectual Property. The latter, 
being less familiar than the realm of physical property, may be 
more capable of being seen free of the deadening overlay of 
habit. 
In this realm of intangibles, we can see most vividly 
how, why and where the law erodes the two supposed 
certainties mentioned above: ( 1) the claim that persons need not 
7 
8 
9 
Milton Friedman and others have of course argued that property can function 
to increase liberty as well as to limit it. But that is a different topic. 
See International New Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918) 
(news items ordinarily considered in the public domain were considered 
"quasi-property" when taken by a competitor). 
See, e.g., sources citeditifra, note 11. 
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pay for benefits they receive except when they have agreed to 
pay, and (2) the claim that an intentional taking of personal 
property, or an intentional crossing of a property boundary, is 
prima facie actionable. Along the way, I hope to persuade the 
reader that standards as vague as the "fairness" in "fair use" or 
the "unjust" in "unjust enrichment" have both an underlying 
logic and a legitimate role to play .10 While my points are not 
novel, 11 the illustration, by means of Restitution and Copyright, 
might be. Among other things, uncertainty can have particular 
utility in the Intellectual Property area where the law gives 
monopoly power in order to provide economic incentives for 
creation. 12 As Professors Ayres and Klemperer argue, "the last 
bit of monopoly pricing provides disproportionately small 
profits in comparison to its social cost" ,13 so that social benefit 
can be significantly enhanced by legal doctrines that deprive IP 
owners of the certainty needed to extract the full monopoly 
price.14 Ayres and Klemperer explicitly recommend tempering 
the reach of IP law by using open-textured standards. ts 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Standards such as .. reasonableness" or "fairness" delegate so much power to 
decision-makers in individual cases that they make prediction difficult, that is, 
standards produce ab ante uncertainty. A prolific literature compares and 
contrasts the functions served by sharp-edged and certain rules with vaguer 
standards. A wonderful window into that literature is offered by two short 
pieces that introduce its major themes and do much to clarify them: Carol 
ROSE, "Crystals and Mud in Property Law", (1988) 40Stan. L. Rev. 577 and 
Frederick SCHAUER, "Dimensions", (1997) 82 Iowa L. Rev. 911. 
See, for example, Joan WILLIAMS, "The Rhetoric of Property", (1998) 83 
Iowa L. Rev. 277, 278 (seeking to "defamiliarize" property notions.) The 
second of the claims I investigate - the notion that property owners have a 
truly exclusive dominion - has been notably subject to scholarly analysis. 
See, e.g., Joan WILLIAMS, supra; Carol M. ROSE, "Canons of Property 
Talk, or, Blacktone's Anxiety", (1988) 108 Yale L. J. 601; Frank 
MICHELMAN, "Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property", (1982) 24 
Nomos 3 (J. PENNOCK & J. CHAPMAN (eds)). 
See Ian AYRES aud Paul KLEMPERER, "Limiting Patentees' Market Power 
Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of 
Uncertainty and Non-injunctive Remedies", (1999) 97 Mich. L. Rev. 985. 
Id., at 987-988. 
Id. 
Id., at 1024-1026. 
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The essay that follows examines the boundary between 
two sets of rules. The first set arises under the law of 
Restitution, particularly the rule that volunteers ordinarily need 
not be rewarded. (Another way to state this same Restitution 
rule is to say that the retention of benefit voluntarily conferred 
is ordinarily not "unjust enrichment".) The second set of rules 
are those of Intellectual Property law, which creates property in 
a special kind of volunteer. My argument is simply that the law 
of Restitution leads almost directly to the law of Intellectual 
Property, though the two areas are premised on diametrically 
opposed baseline certainties. 
For simplicity's sake, the essay primarily uses one 
methodology - that of economics. Of course, American and 
Canadian law have many dimensions. Rules and practices are 
most stable when they are supported by the convergence of 
many policies, of which economics is merely one.16 Thus the 
essay does address some additional policies, such as autonomy 
and the principle of equal respect for persons, when they are 
particularly apt. Nevertheless, for ease of exposition, the 
economic analysis will dominate. Hopefully, it will demonstrate 
both why the boundaries between liberty and property are fuzzy, 
and the nature of some of the principles that help shift the 
boundaries in one direction or another. 
The essay then turns to examining the doctrine of 
property law that the intentional crossing of a property 
boundary is prima facie actionable. The essay uses three 
American doctrines from intellectual property, "fair use", "the 
idea/expression dichotomy", and "substantial similarity", to 
demonstrate that in appropriate circumstances, even this 
apparent certainty must give way. 
In its final stage, the essay turns from exposition to 
advocacy. I hope to persuade my Canadian readers to reconsider 
the certainty with which Canadian law now favors an 
established artist's interests over those of a parodist and her 
audience. 
16 Guido Calabresi's book TRAGIC CHOICES gives many examples that 
illustrate the kind of instability, or cyclic institutional and rule chaoges, that 
result when resource limitations make convergence of principles unavailable. 
(I am also indebted here to Randy Barnett.) 
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Today Canada and the United States have adopted quite 
opposed approaches to parody. In the U.S., the "fair use" 
doctrine will often shelter a parody that embodies a substantial 
portion of the work that it ridicules. This was demonstrated 
vividly in the recent U.S. Supreme Court case considering 
whether a rap group, "2 Live Crew" could, without permission, 
lawfully record and commercially distribute a parody of the Ray 
Orbison hit, "Oh, Pretty Woman."17 The Court remanded the 
copyright owner's infringement case for further consideration, 
in an opinion that stressed the open-ended nature of the fair use 
doctrine. is In Canada, by contrast, the doctrine of "fair dealing" 
does not provide much shelter for parodies, 19 and this hostility 
is underlined by Canada's generous statutory treatment of what 
17 
18 
19 
Lyrics of the parody included lines like, "Big hairy woman you need to shave 
that stuff' and .. Two timin' woman now I know the baby ain't mine." The 
lyrics of both the Orbison song and the parody appear in full at Campbell v. 
Acuff Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) at Appendices A and B to the 
majority opinion. 
Campbellv. Acuff Rose Music Inc., supra, note 17. 
By contrast with the open-ended fair use doctrine of the U.S., presented at 
note 54 below, the Canadian fair dealing provisions are narrow and specific, 
applying only to research or private study, news reporting, and criticism or 
review. Not only would the copying involved in a parody likely violate an 
author's ordinary rights under copyright law, but, since a parody distorts an 
original work, it could also violate the right of integrity. The Canadian 
provisions on fair dealing follow. 
Copyright Act, R.S.C., (1985) ch. C-42, Section 29 (Can.) (as amended, 1997) 
''EXCEPTIONS 
Fair Dealing 
Research or private study 
29. Fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study does not infringe 
copyright. 
Criticism or review 
29.1 Fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review does not infringe 
copyright if the following are mentioned: 
(a) the source; and 
(b) if given in the source, the name of the 
(i) author, in the case of a work, 
(ii) performer, in the case of a performer's performance, 
(iii) maker, in the case of a sound recording, or 
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it calls the artist's "moral right of integrity".20 Although the 
Supreme Court of Canada has not addressed any case of 
"parody", the Canadian fair dealing statute lays out a set of 
crystalline rules into which it would be difficult to squeeze most 
parody cases. 21 
The essay elucidates an economic logic that helps to 
explain the uncertain, open-ended, case-by-case treatment of the 
United States courts. In the process, it is hoped that at least 
20 
21 
(iv) broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal. 
News reporting 
29.2 Fair dealing for the purpose of news reporting does not infringe 
copyright if the following are mentioned: 
(a) the source; and 
(b) if given in the source, the name of the 
(i) author, in the case of a work, 
(ii) performer, in the case of a performer's performance, 
(iii) maker, in the case of a sound recording, or 
(iv) broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal." 
Canada's moral rights statute is part of its copyright law, and applies to 
virtually any copyrighted work. Copyright Act, supra, note 19, s. 14.1. 
Relevant excerpts are set forth below at note 106. Note in particular Canada's 
right of integrity, which forbids alterations to a work - even a work such as a 
song - that prejudice an author's reputation. 
Thus, in Cie Gin.irate des Etablissements Micheline-Michelin & Cie v. 
CA. W.-Canada, (1996) 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348; 1996 CPR LEXIS 2377 (Federal 
Court, Trial Division, 1996), a Canadian court imposed liability on a union for 
its parodic use of a Michelin logo cartoon character as part of an organizing 
campaign at a Michelin plant The court declined to apply the reasoning of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Acuff-Rose and instead applied the Canadian statute 
strictly, 17 C.P.R. at 380-385. The court contrasted the non-exhaustive nature 
of the factors listed in the U.S. Fair Use provision with the bounded and rule-
like Canadian approach. The court noted: 
"The exceptions to acts of copyright infringement are exhaustively listed as 
a closed set in sub-sections 27(2) to 27(m) and 27(3) of the [Canadian] 
Copyright Act They should be restrictively interpreted as exceptions. 
[ ... ] [P]arody does not exist as a facet of 'criticism' [ ... ] for the purposes of 
the Copyright Act." Id, at 381. 
Nevertheless, the court did intimate, in dicta, that some "critical variation" of 
the cartoon character might be permitted "within the context of a newspaper 
or journal article" about the company whose symbol it was. Id., at 385. 
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some Canadians might be led to appreciate the merits of an 
approach which, under the "fair use doctrine", sometimes does 
allow parodies to distort copyrighted works. My argument is in 
part motivated by the value that transgressive and appropriative 
works bring to a culture.22 Nevertheless, as mentioned, in this 
piece I will largely confine my analytic tools to the economic. 
Intellectual property law is exciting because it is where 
we can see new rights being created as we watch. It reminds us 
that much of what concerns scholars comes to life daily in the 
hands of judges and legislators. 
I. Goals 
Western culture has long recognized the tension between 
the law's need to speak clearly to cover broad classes of cases, 
and the desire to do justice in the individual case. Thus, for 
example, Aristotle wrote, "When the law speaks universally, 
then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the 
universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us 
and has erred by its over-simplicity, to correct the omission 
[ ... ]''23. 
Such practices are often referred to as "equitable", and 
as presented by Aristotle (at least in this translation), they seem 
uncontroversial. However, it over-simplifies to speak of 
correcting an "omission." A judge who wants to give 
individualized relief will often need to do more than merely fill 
in an omitted blank. Rather, she may be called on to disregard a 
law that indeed covers the case, or she may need to utilize an 
22 
23 
See Rosemary Coombe' s work for valuable exploration of this theme. 
Rosemary J. COOMBE, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties, Durham, 
N.C., Duke U. Press, 1998. For an introduction to my own views on the topic, 
see Wendy J. GORDON and Sam POSTBRIEF, "On Commodifying 
Intangibles", (1998) 10 Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 135-161 
(review essay); Wendy J. GORDON, "Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: 
The Norms of Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship" (review 
essay), (1990) 57 University of Chicago Law Review 1009-1049; Wendy J. 
GORDON, "Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use", (1992) 55 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 93-107. 
ARISTOTLE, "10 Ethics", in The Nicomachean Ethics, 133, D. Ross trans., 
revised by J.L. Ackrill & J.O. Unnson, Oxford, 1984. 
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equitable device (often a legal fiction such as "constructive 
trust") that allows her to achieve a result contrary to what the 
written rule would have led an observer to expect. 
A judge can have good reason for such actions. A law 
that is always applied literally can lead to results that undermine 
legitimacy. Sharp-edged rules can be over-inclusive or under-
inclusive, and inappropriate results can be costly in both human 
and economic terms. 
Judge-made exceptions constitute only one route to 
individualized treatment. Another route is for the legislature 
itself to frame its dictates in terms of a broad standard, such as 
"fairness" or "reasonableness." Similarly, the legislature can 
subject hard-edged rules to an exception described by such a 
broad standard. When the legislature inserts broad language 
such as "fairness" into a statute, it is deliberately delegating 
some of its power to the individual tribunals that will be 
required to interpret the fuzzy command. Again the goal is to 
avoid the costs that a more certain rule can impose when its 
hard edges prove over-inclusive or under-inclusive. 
But just as certainty can impose costs and threaten 
legitimacy, so can equity and the use of broad standards24. For 
example, a regime of flexible and individualized treatment 
involves not only high administrative costs, but also dangers of 
bias, inconsistency, and insecurity. Just as excessive rigidity can 
undermine a legal system's legitimacy, so can excessive 
flexibility. 
One way of potentially resolving this tension is to 
regularize the grants of equitable treatment themselves. Thus, 
the likelihood of individualized relief can become gradual! y 
24 Excellent reviews of the literature appear in two short pieces: Carol M. ROSE, 
"Crystals and Mud in Property Law", (1988) 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577 
(distinguishing hard-edged rules, which she calls "crystals", from "fuzzy, 
ambiguous rules of decision", which she calls "muddy", and taking an 
economic approach to analyzing their different functions), and Frederick 
SCHAUER, "Prescriptions in Three Dimensions", (1997) 82 Iuwa L. Rev. 911 
(sorting out the many strands of debate typically subsumed under the phrase 
"rules vs. standards.") Another valuable summary is presented in Kathleen M. 
SULLIVAN, 'The Justices of Rules and Standards", (1992) 106 Harv. L. Rev. 
22, 57-69. 
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more predictable. Another potential "resolution" is the so-called 
free market: If property rights are well defined, individuals can 
trade entitlements to suit individual needs. 
In a perfect market, it is argued, all goods will flow to 
their highest-valued uses by the consensual behavior of the 
affected parties. Thus, when the Invisible Hand works properly, 
both certainty and individuation can coexist. 
Of course, the perfect market of the Invisible Hand has 
virtually no counterpart in reality. In the real world, for 
example, transactions are costly to consummate. Third parties 
are affected by decisions in whose making they had no part. 
Further, knowledge is imperfect, extreme income inequalities 
abound, strategic behavior can block mutually-beneficial 
coordination, and some resources cannot be commodified 
without losing part or all of their value. So for these reasons 
(among many others), clear-cut property rules cannot always be 
relied upon. Even if one begins from neo-classical economic 
premises, law might appropriately favor the use of standards as 
well as sharply defined rules. 
Although this essay touches on many topics, the central 
problem addressed is parody: how should a copyright court 
react when someone copies a copyrighted work and distorts it in 
a way that ridicules the original? As already mentioned, the 
approach is different in Canada and in the United States. In 
Canada, the copyright owner and potential parodist know the 
law contains a fairly certain rule which forbids parodies unless 
the copyright owner's consent is first obtained. In the United 
States, by contrast, the parties know that the situation is 
governed by the uncertainties of the broad "fair use" doctrine. 
Why shouldn't the copyright owner's right of control be 
consistently enforced, leaving it to author and parodist to 
bargain over who values the resource use more highly? That 
question is addressed directly in the essay's Section IV. 
Before reaching that point, the paper explores a number 
of related matters. The remaining pages of Section I will briefly 
summarize the primary economic goals of copyright. Sections II 
and III compare "standards" with "rules" in the context of an 
achieving these and related economic goals, examining 
doctrines within the law of both Copyright and Restitution. 
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Section IV addresses copying that is done for the purposes of 
criticism and parody. The Conclusion argues that the better 
approach is to utilize the broad standard of "fair use". 
A. Market failure and market success 
The reader is probably familiar with the basic problem 
cited as the usual justification for intellectual property regimes: 
it is a form of market failure that prevents consumers from 
having available as many new intellectual products as they 
would be willing to pay for. Usually termed the "public goods" 
problem, it is briefly described below. What is less recognized 
is the fact that such market failure is only half of the 
prerequisite for justifying copyright: the other requisite 
condition is that there be less costly market imperfections after 
intellectual property is instituted than there would have been in 
the absence of the intellectual property regime. 25 
B. Market failure in the absence of intellectual 
property 
"Public goods" are defined by having two 
characteristics, inexhaustibility and nonexcludability. Most 
intangibles have these characteristics to some extent. Intangibles 
tend to be inexhaustible over a large range of utilization 
(everyone can sing or play the same song, or build the same 
design of engine). They also tend to be difficult for proprietors 
to fence off (once encountered and remembered, anyone can 
reproduce the song or design).26 If production of a public good 
25 
26 
This is explored more deeply in W. J. GORDON, "On Owning Information: 
Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse", loc. cit., note 1, 230-
238; W. J. GORDON, "Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemna 
in Intellectual Property", (1990) 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. 853 [hereinafter W. J. 
GORDON, "Asymetric Market Failure"] and Wendy J. GORDON, "Of 
Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution and Intellectual Property", loc. cit., 
note I. 
That a good is "inexhaustible" does not mean that one person's use of it will 
never affect others' use. For example, at the extreme, the value of a song can 
become zero through saturation-level repetition, and some exhaustible 
physical products - such as plastic for a phonograph record or a radio set -
may be necessary to afford access to the intangible. Practically spealcing, then, 
songs may not be infinitely available to all as a valuable good. 
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is left entirely to the private market, lack of fencing can lead to 
under-production, for usually a producer needs either subsidy 
from government or patron, or a mode of excluding non-payors, 
if he or she wishes to obtain payment for what he or she has 
made. Without patronage or a mode of excluding free-riders, the 
payoff from investing in creative activities will be low, and 
incentives will be inadequate to induce production of as many 
new intangible goods as the public would be willing to pay for. 
Some public goods, such as national defense, can be 
produced through use of a state apparatus.27 This approach has 
the virtue of responding to both "public goods" characteristics. 
State production (1) can take advantage of inexhaustibility by 
making the benefit available to all, and (2) resolves the problem 
of underproduction by requiring everyone, through taxes, to 
pay. 
Like most nations, the United States is committed to the 
belief that sole reliance on state-directed production or 
bureaucratic subsidy is not the best way to produce inventions 
and art. In the realm of inventions, probably the most obvious 
danger of state control is the bureaucratic tendency to resist 
innovation. In the realm of cultural products, the most obvious 
dangers of state control are "lack of taste,"28 and the possibility 
of censorship. (A history of free enterprise, of course, also plays 
27 
28 
The same partiality characterizes an intangible's nonexcludability. Thus, for 
example, though songs are easy to copy once heard, the initial score may be 
easy for the composer to keep private. Or the composer may be able to extract 
no-copy promises from his early, small audiences. Even after a song is 
popular, it may be desired in a format that favors an authorized producer's 
distribution networks. See note 29 and accompanying text for more discussion 
of this point. 
The extent to which public provision of public goods is indeed necessary in 
various contexts is, of course, a matter of debate. For example, Ronald Coase 
has shown that although lighthouses are a classic public good (their light cau 
be used by a virtually unlimited number of ships within range, aud no ship can 
be practicably excluded from their light), some lighthouses have in fact been 
built through non-governmental arrangements. See R. H. COASE, "The 
Lighthouse in Economics", (1974) 17 J. Law & Econ. 357. 
Or, more precisely, there is a need for taste to evolve outside the state 
apparatus in order for individuals to maintain some degree of genuine self-
determination. See, e.g., C. Edwin BAKER, "Property and its Relation to 
Constitntionally Protected Liberty", (1986) 134 U. Pa. Law Rev. 741. 
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a role.) Whatever the reason, there is a consensus in the United 
States that a diversity of private initiatives needs to be enlisted, 
and that state production - despite its ability to respond to both 
inexhaustibility and nonexcludability - should not be the 
primary route to follow in regard to inventions and art. As for 
private subsidy through foundation and the like, support from 
that sector is often unavailable or sparse. 
Thus, the United States opted for primary reliance on 
use of the private market to generate incentives for the 
production of inventions and art. Using a market requires curing 
the excludability problem. Some scholars have argued that 
significant modes of exclusion are available independent of the 
law.29 For instance, even in a legal system without copyright 
(one might call such a system "copy liberty"), a writer and her 
authorized publisher could obtain payment through exploiting 
natural levers such as the advantage of being first in a market or 
having a reputation for providing authentic, distortion-free texts. 
But within the first years of the American republic, its Congress 
decided30 to provide legally enforceable rights of exclusion by 
enacting intellectual property laws such as copyright and patent. 
These laws give individual creative persons the right to forbid 
copying31 of their works. 
29 
30 
31 
Scholars who are critical of copyright, or who doubt the wisdom of its 
expansion, typically argue that copyright may not be necessary for creators to 
obtain payment for their work. See, e.g., Stephen BREYER, "The Uneasy 
Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, aod 
Computer Programs", (1970) 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 350; Tom PALMER, 
"Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach", 
(1989) 12 Hamline L. Rev. 261 . 
On the U.S. computer front, various forms of technological fences (including 
cryptography) have been recently given a legal "assist" by Congress with the 
adoption of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Although many 
technological fences are permeable to hacking, the Act makes most such 
technical bypass unlawful. See 17 U.S.C. Section 1201 et seq. 
The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to enact copyright aod patent "for 
limited times" to further ''the progress of Science and the useful arts." U.S. 
Const art I, paragraph 8, cl. 8. Congress enacted its first copyright statute in 
1790. 
Also, American patent law prohibits even duplication of the patented 
invention that happens to result from completely independent efforts. 
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This right valuably supplements the author's physical 
control over her manuscript. It makes publishers and 
manufacturers willing to pay meaningful sums for the privilege 
of copying because the exclusive right provides some protection 
against unauthorized competition from outsiders. 
Thus, intellectual property law responds primarily to the 
second "public goods" characteristic - difficulty of fencing -
and does so by altering that characteristic by legal fiat. The law 
provides fences, which in turn assist the producers in capturing 
for their own pockets some of the benefits their efforts generate. 
The system relies on the premise that such enrichment will 
induce new investment in creative endeavor and that enough 
new investment will be created -investment that would not 
otherwise exist - that the value produced by this investment 
will outweigh the extra administrative and other costs of the 
intellectual property system. 32 
32 See William M. LANDES & Richard A. POSNER, "An Economic Analysis 
of Copyright Law'", (1989) 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 326. See also Stanley J. 
LIEBOWITZ, "Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination", 
(1986) 8 Res. L. & Econ. 181 (edited by R. Z'.erbe). 
What matters is not the absolute level of costs involved in an intellectual 
property system, but rather a comparison among the costs of the various 
potential systems. Even a system of no intellectual property rights will have 
significant administrative costs. Thus, assume there were a legal regime that 
rejected patent and copyright and recognized only individually-negotiated 
contracts as a limitation on the public's ability to copy. In such a context, for 
example, inventors may spend a good deal of money on policing the secrecy 
of their inventions, composers may spend a good deal of money on obtaining 
contractual promises-not-to-copy from people who seek entry to concerts, and 
the like. 
Similarly, it shonld not be imagined that intellectual property rights are the 
only way that costly decreases in public access occur. A regime without 
intellectual property rights will afford far from unlimited access to the public. 
To use the prior examples: the inventor unprotected by patent may be 
unwilling to trade information with rival !inns, and composers unprotected by 
copyright may be unwilling to allow radios or television to broadcast their 
music to general audiences. 
For further analysis of the many possible alternatives to copyright law and 
their costs, see W. J. GORDON, "Merits of Copyright", loc. cit., note 3. 
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C. Success of the intellectual property market 
An intellectual property market cannot be "perfect," if 
by perfection one means a market where everyone willing to 
pay more than a good's marginal cost is able to purchase the 
good and where the producers' costs are also covered. No 
matter how low the marginal cost of producing an extra copy of 
an intangible might be - and it might be as low as zero33 -
some people who are willing to pay for a copy at that level or 
above will not have access to it if intellectual property law 
allows producers to demand payment in excess of marginal cost. 
A price above marginal cost is desirable for incentives, 
for it is hoped that the price will cover research and 
development expenses and induce other potential producers to 
make new intangibles. Nevertheless it is clear that a right of 
exclusion, although the core of intellectual property law, is only 
a partial response to intangibles' public goods characteristics, 
for such law leaves the public unable to take full advantage of 
the inexhaustibility of intangibles. Instead, the failed promise of 
inexhaustibility merely exaggerates the deadweight loss that is a 
cost for all monopolies. 
Thus, in addition to providing a right of exclusion, a 
successful intellectual property system should also be tailored to 
take as much advantage of inexhaustability as possible. If 
something can be copied at no cost, there must be some 
instances in which allowing free copying will be Pareto-
superior.34 As will appear, the American legal system makes 
33 
34 
The marginal cost of producing an extra unit of an intangible may be zero, 
because of inexhaustability, or it may be some positive sum corresponding to 
the cost of the intangible's physical embodiment (such as the cost of the 
plastic that goes into a phonograph record). 
It might be argued that in cases of true Pareto-superiority, the law would not 
need to provide a safe-harbor for free copying: if the owners of the patents 
and copyrights were truly unharmed by the copying (as the notion of pareto-
superiority assumes), they would allow the copying to proceed without 
hindrance. 
However, humans are both envious and insecure. The copyright owner might 
refuse permission not because he is suffering tangible harm, but because he is 
initated that other people are getting a free ride or because he has irrational 
fears about future harm. A society may well choose to consider itself entitled 
to disregard envy and insecurity as legally relevant harms. 
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some effort to recapture the lost promise of inexhaustability. 
Some of these efforts take the form of "certain" and hard-edged 
rules, such as the statutory provisions that place copyrights in 
the public domain after a specified number of years,35 and some 
take the form of "uncertain" or "fuzzy" doctrines such as fair 
use.36 
II. Comparing "clear rules" with the uncertainty 
of case-by-case responses 
For an intellectual property regime to have even a 
chance of producing more allocative gain than a "copy-liberty" 
regime, the intellectual property regime must produce resource 
packages that are tradable.37 It must also minimize its 
deadweight costs and other imperfections. In the following, the 
article will explore some of the devices that American copyright 
35 
36 
37 
In addition, attention has to be paid to defining "harm". Some cases are easy. 
For example, assume that the copyist or adaptor is taking customers who 
would otherwise buy or license from the author, customers who constitute part 
of the very market at which the author was aiming when she set out to create 
the work. It would be fairly uncontroversial to call such copying or adaptation 
"harmful". Conversely, if the copyist or adaptor of the copyrighted work is 
serving a market which the original author is incapable of reaching, either 
directly or by licensing, then the author is not "harmed" by being denied a 
right over this market. See W. J. GORDON, "Fair Use as Market Failure: A 
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors," 
(1982) 82 Columbia L. Rev. 1600 (arguing that in cases of complete market 
failure, where administrative costs or other problems would prevent a 
copyright owner from being able to serve a given group of customers, it is 
likely to be appropriate to allow "fair use" to those customers when they copy 
without permission.) 
Between these extremes many debatable cases exist for which there will be no 
obvious answer to the question of what constitutes "harm". In such cases the 
law would have to normatively decide what kind of baseline entitlement 
should be secured to the author. Erosion of a relevant baseline constitutes 
harm. 
After a set number of years, all works of authorship go into the public domain. 
17 U.S.C. section 302-305 (duration of copyrights). Duration is discussed 
infra, at text accompanying note 90 and following. 
The doctrine of "fair use" is discussed further at infra, section N. 
Cf Clifford HOLDERNESS, "A Legal Foundation for Exchange", (1985) 14 
J. Legal Stud. 321. 
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law employs to bring "success" to the intellectual property 
market - which means keeping its imperfections to a 
minimum. 
Some of these devices are system-wide responses. 
Adjudication under sharply defined rules is sometimes 
accomplished by using a "formal" approach, often associated 
with the notion of "property owner as sovereign." The strict 
liability aspects of copyright have this character, as will be 
noted below. Copyright law also has another kind of response: 
employment of open-textured standards which require case-by-
case substantive inquiry. Under the latter kind of devices, a 
court typically makes a substantive judgment as to the 
desirability of commodifying the resource or behavior at issue, 
and decides whether (if the resource is ordinarily suitable for 
buying and selling) its use must be paid for by the particular 
defendant in the particular context. 
A. Definitions: formal property rules as compared 
with substantive reasonableness standards 
In American common law, violation of most property or 
personal rights will be termed a "tort. "38 Yet torts themselves 
tend to fall into two broad categories: intentional torts like 
battery or trespass, which are ordinarily actionable without 
proof that the defendant's specific behavior was socially 
undesirable, and unintentional torts, which are ordinarily 
actionable only if the plaintiff shows that the defendant's 
38 The other two types of rights that can be sued upon in American civil (non-
criminal) courts are those arising out of contract law and restitution. 
"Restitution" is concerned with benefits rather than harms. See W. J. 
GORDON, "Of Harms and Benefits'', loc. cit., note 1. See also Saul 
LEVMORE, "Explaining Restitution", (1985) 71 Va. L. Rev. 65. Like 
negligence law, restitution involves a case-by-case mode of adjudication. 
In restitution a person brings suit on the ground that the defendant has been 
unjustly enriched and that this enrichment came either at the plaintiff's 
expense or by violating some right of his. There is an obvious need for case-
by-case adjudication in order to decide what emichments are "unjust." 
Restitution also functions as a remedy following on the violation of other 
rights (e.g., restitution may require a trespasser to return the profit he made by 
trespassing on a plaintiff's land). Restitution is discussed further in this article 
at Section II, C, beginning at page 86 below. 
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behavior was negligent or otherwise unreasonable. As a matter 
of categorization, the first type of tort can be viewed as 
following a "property" or "formal" model and the second as 
following a "nonformal tort," "reasonableness" or "substantive" 
model.39 
In the "property" or "formal" model, the courts defer to 
the property owner as if she were a mini-sovereign, making no 
inquiry into whether the owner's decision to exclude a 
defendant was proper or improper, or whether the defendant's 
use of the owner's resource was harmful or productive. A 
classic example under American law is trespass to land. 
Someone who enters land reasonably but mistakenly thinking he 
has the right to do so will be liable as a trespasser, as will 
someone who entered the land out of a pressing (but not life-
saving) need for a shortcut. 40 Following out the analogy to 
sovereignty, the primary relevant question in these cases is 
essentially jurisdictional:41 inquiring into whether the defendant 
crossed a boundary over which the owner possessed an 
39 
40 
41 
I am indebted here to the work of William Powers. Comparing trespass with 
negligence, for example, Professor Powers notes: 
"Ownership embodies a formal methodology, since [ ... ] questions 
concerning appropriate use are answered wholly by asking whether a 
proposed use has been sanctioned by the owner. A decision by the 
landowner[ ... ] concludes legal debate under the ownership model. On the 
other hand, a duty of reasonable use embodies a nonformal methodology 
because it makes direct, ad hoc reference to efficiency [or other measures 
of social desirability]. Under this model, a decision concerning the 
landowner [ ... ] would depend on a comparison of relative costs and benefits 
in the specific case." 
William C. POWERS, Jr., "A Methodological Perspective on the Duty to Act" 
(review essay), (1979) 57 Texas L. Rev. 523, 526-527. 
Admittedly, even in intentional torts American courts may take cognizance of 
excuses (such as incapacity) and justifications (such as necessity or self-
defense ). lbis does not undermine the distinction between intentional and 
unintentional torts, however. Not only is the burden of proving such 
intentional-tort defenses typically on the defendant, but these defenses also 
permit a court far less latitude than does the broad balancing of costs and 
benefits which a court engages in under a reasonableness inquiry. Thus, a 
person taking a shortcut through another's land can take advantage of the 
necessity defense nnly if an imminent danger made the shortcut imperative. 
See W. C. POWERS Jr., loc. cit., note 39. 
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exclusive right and did so without obtaining the owner's 
consent. If so, the defendant has broken the relevant rule and is 
liable. 
By contrast, in the "nonformal tort" or "reasonableness" 
model, a court does not assume as a prima facie matter that 
deference is owed to the decisions of the property owner. 
Instead, the court makes its own substantive inquiry into the 
desirability of the defendant's boundary-crossing. Further, the 
burden of proof will likely be placed on the plaintiff to satisfy 
the court that the defendant's behavior was wrongful, and 
typically wrongfulness will be defined by reference to an open-
textured standard. A classic example in the United States is 
negligence law: in unintentional auto accidents, unless a 
defendant is found to have lacked "due care," she will not be 
required to pay for the damage she caused. 
American copyright law follows an uneasy middle 
course between the more certain "formal" model and the less 
certain "reasonableness" model. On the one hand, virtually any 
unauthorized substantial copying of a protected subject matter is 
subject to a prima facie prohibition. For example, even 
"unconscious copying" gives rise to liability. Similarly, if a 
clever plagiarist convinces a magazine publisher that a short 
story is original, the publisher's good-faith belief that she had 
the real author's permission to print will not help the publisher 
avoid liability in a copyright infringement suit. This partakes of 
a formal or "property" approach. 
On the other hand, the fact-finder (usually the jury) has 
both latitude and significant normative responsibility in 
deciding how much similarity amounts to 
"substantiality."Although the quantity copied will be important 
in the determination of substantiality, the inquiry remains 
remarkably open.42 In any case that involves other than exact 
42 There are many verbal formulations as to the meaning of "substantial 
similarity," also known as "illicit copying," but none does very much to 
defme the jury's task. Consider, for example, a classic case regarding music 
infringement, Arnstein v. Porter. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied 
330 U.S. 851 (1947). First, the court valuably noted that, "Assuming that 
adequate proof is made of copying, that is not enough; for there can be 
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copying, a defendant will probably try to argue that his work is 
not "substantially similar" to plaintiffs copyrighted work. 
In addition, both American and Canadian copyright law 
permit anyone to copy the "idea" from a copyrighted work, so 
long as the copyist does not also borrow the work's 
"expression."43 Since no firm definition of what constitutes an 
"idea" has ever evolved, the idea/expression dichotomy is fully 
dependent on a judge's characterization of what constitutes an 
"idea". By characterizing something as an "idea", a judge is 
essentially ruling that it is something that cannot be 
commodified for purposes of private ownership, but rather 
should be commonly shared. No certain rule has yet been 
developed capable of exhaustively defining what kinds of 
human mental product should or should not be commodified. I 
suggest no such "rule" is even possible. 
Most of the literature on commodification admits the 
difficulty of the questions raised.44 Thus, consider SPHERES 
OF JUSTICE, where Michael Walzer makes a convincing case 
(if one were needed) that monetary criteria should not rule all 
spheres. Some goods - such as political office, artistic prestige, 
basic human dignity - should not be made into commodities 
43 
44 
'permissible copying,' copying which is not illicit." Id. at 472. But then it 
foundered when it had to distinguish rightful from illicit copying: 
"The proper criterion on that issue [ ... ] is whether defendant took from 
plaintiff's works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, 
who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that 
the defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the 
plaintiff." 
Id. at473. 
Aside from the reference to the lay (non-expert) audience, this formulation 
offers no more than vague references to quantity ("so much"), to market 
value, and to a conclusory notion of wrongfulness. 
In American copyright law, this principle appears explicitly in the statute. 17 
U.S.C. Section 102. Canadian doctrine is so similar that an overview of 
Canadian law makes reference to the U.S. statute to explain the principle. 
Lesley Ellen HARRIS, Canadian Copyright Law, 2nd ed., Ontario, 1995, at 
16. 
See, e.g., Margaret Jane RADIN, Contested Commodities, Cambridge, 
Harvard U. Press, 1996 (particularly her discussion of the "double bind."). 
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for purchase and sale. 45 But Walzer is less clear about what 
institutions should mediate society's difficult choices over what 
behaviors and resources should be placed in the market sphere, 
and what behaviors and resources should be governed by non-
market criteria. 
One institutional possibility is for the legislature to set 
out particular rules, and then for that same legislature to change 
the rules as circumstances change, or as particular norms come 
under pressure. Tiris has occurred. Thus, United States rules on 
conscription have changed and changed again, including at 
several points a rule of commodification: under the nation's first 
conscription law, a draftee could lawfully "hire a substitute in 
his place."46 Under a succeeding statute, Congress "set a flat fee 
of$ 300 for exemption from induction."47 Later, of course, such 
monetary exemptions became anathema, and successive rule 
changes gave other criteria (consider, e.g., educational 
deferments from the draft) their chance at being a governing 
norm. 
But such rule changes take time to implement. Arguably, 
the technology that drives modem copyright markets changes 
too fast - and arguably, the norms concerned are so subtle and 
the dynamics of power politics too insensitive to the public 
interest48 - to rely on legislative rule-making and rule-
changing as an optimal route for defining the boundaries 
between the market and non-market alternatives. 
45 
46 
47 
48 
Cf. Michael WALZER, Spheres of justice: a defense of pluralism and 
equality, New York, Basic Books (arguing that money should not to dominate 
all spheres of life, and that some way must be found to distinguish the 
monetary sphere from spheres where other values should predominate.) 
Guido CALABRESI and Philip BOBBIT!', Tragic Choices, New York, W.W. 
Norton & Co., 1978, at 159. 
Id., at 160. 
Jessica Litman' s studies of the legislative process in the recent U.S. Copyright 
arena suggest that it has served private interests much more consistently than 
it has the public interest. See, e.g., Jessica D. LITMAN, "Copyright 
Legislation and Techoological change", (1989) 68 Or. L. Rev. 275; Jessica D. 
LITMAN, "Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History", (1987) 72 
Cornell L. Rev. 851. This is likely to lead to over-commodification. 
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A perhaps preferable institutional possibility is for the 
legislature to adopt vague standards. As has been often noted, 
vagueness delegates to other decision-makers (largely judges) 
the power to fill in the details. Congress chose this route when it 
declared that "ideas" cannot be owned in copyright law.49 
without ever defining what constitutes an "idea". As a result, 
shifting norms and facts have fed into judges' conceptions of 
what should be declared an "idea" and thus placed outside the 
bounds of copyright ownership. 
An example of judges' shifting instincts on this issue 
can be seen in their treatment of whether "compatibility 
standards" in the computer field can be protected by copyright. 
At one point, a defendant was ridiculed for claiming that he 
should be entitled to copy whatever was essential to the "idea" 
of producing a computer capable of running standard Apple 
programs. That was not an "idea", said the Court.50 More 
recently, a court to the contrary indicated that a defendant is free 
to copy "elements that might have been dictated by external 
factors,"51 including elements needed to achieve compatibility 
with "other programs with which [the defendant's program] was 
designed to interact." Such elements were not ownable 
expression. Presumably the courts were influenced by shifts in 
the computer industry, and a growing recognition of the social 
benefit to be gained from fostering network externalities. 52 
49 
50 
51 
52 
17 U.S.C. Section 102(b). 
The court wrote: "Franklin may wish to achieve total compatibility with 
independently developed application programs written for the Apple II, but 
that is a commercial and competitive objective which does not enter into the 
somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and expressions 
have merged." Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp .• 714 F. 2d 
1240 ( 3rd Cir. 1983), cert dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). Tbe Apple II 
operating system was a competitor of the now-dominant DOS system. 
Computer Associates International Inc. v. Altai Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (1992). 
Note, however, that this was not explicitly a holding on what was or was not 
an "idea". 
Basically, if a network grows more valuable to each member when additional 
members join, then each new member is said to confer an "external benefit" 
on the existing membership. There is a growing literature applying network 
externality analysis to the computer field. 
For example, if I use a WINDOWS operating system, I will be better off if 
many other people also use the same system. The more people who use 
WINDOWS, the more application programs will be written for WINDOWS 
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Even in cases where a defendant has committed 
"substantial" copying of "expression", he remains able to call 
upon another important but "muddy"53 standard in American 
copyright law: the doctrine of "fair use". A defendant will have 
no liability for malting a copy which is "fair" in her particular 
circumstances.54 The fair use defense essentially draws the 
court into deciding the social desirability of the defendant's 
copying. 
53 
54 
and thus for me; also, the more people who use WINDOWS, the more easily I 
can communicate with other computer users. Each additional person who 
buys and installs a WINDOWS operating system thus confers a benefit on me. 
The imagery of "mud" for standards and "crystal" for rules originates in C. M. 
ROSE, loc. cit., note 10. 
See 17 U.S.C. Section 107. As originally enacted, section 107 provided as 
follows: 
"107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 [which set out a copyright 
owner's exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, public performance, 
and the like], the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by 
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by 
that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the 
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include -
(1) the purpose and charactet of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work." 
17 U.S.C. Section 107 (1976). The section was recently amended to make 
clear that the unpublished status of a wotk should not be detetminative. 
For my further examinations of the doctrine, see, e.g., W. J. GORDON, "Fair 
Use as Market Failure'', loc. cit., note 34, (using an economic model to unify 
fair use cases and give some precision to the notoriously open-ended 
docttine). See also Wendy J. GORDON, "A Ptoperty Right in Self-
Exptession: Equality and Individualism in the Natutal Law of Intellectual 
Property", (1993) 102 Yale L.J. 1533 [hereinafter W. J. GORDON, "Property 
Right in Self-Expression"]; W. J. GORDON, "Reality as Artifact: From Feist 
to Fair Use", loc. cit., note 22. 
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Although the fair use doctrine appears in the Copyright 
Act, that statute declines to set out any definite strictures. 55 
Formal line-drawing is rejected. As the legislative history 
recounts, "[S]ince the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no 
generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising 
the question must be decided on its own facts."56 At one point it 
seemed that the Supreme Court was willing to bring a bit more 
certainty to the doctrine, for one majority opinion seemed to 
declare that any commercial use is presumptively unfair, or at 
least that one of the fair use factors would be presumptively 
resolved against the defendant.57 More recently, however, in the 
context of a commercial parody, the Supreme Court 
reinterpreted its prior statement and wrote that "no such 
evidentiary presumption is available."58 Similarly, when a 
Supreme Court opinion59 was applied as if it had adopted a rule 
making fair use unavailable for unpublished works, the 
Congress responded by amending the fair use statute to specify 
that the unpublished nature of a plaintiff's work was only one 
factor among many.60 Thus, both the Court and Congress have 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
The legislative history of section 107 indicates that. despite the statutory 
recognition accorded fair use, the nature of the doctrine remains to be defined 
by case law: "The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial 
doctrine of fair use. but there is no disposition to freeze the statute [ ... ] "H.R. 
Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680 
[hereinafter House Report]. See also S. Rep. No. 94-473, 1st Sess. 62 (1975) 
[Senate Report]. The courts have recognized their freedom to continue the 
development of fair use doctrine. Se€; e.g., Triangle Publications Inc. v. 
Knight-Ridder Newspapers Inc, 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980) 
("Congress made clear that it in no way intended to depart from Court-created 
principles or to short-circuit further judicial development [ ... ]"). 
House Report at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679. 
Sony, 464 U.S. at 45 I. The fourth fair use factor is "the effect of the use upon 
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work," sec 107(4). In 
regard to that factor, the Court indicated that a likelihood of future harm to a 
plaintiff could be presumed from the commerciality of a defendant's use. Id 
Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music Inc., supra, note 17, at the last page of the 
opinion. The Court at one stage of the Campbell opinion distinguished Sony 
on the ground that Sony involved "mere duplication for commercial purposes" 
while Campbell involved a transformative use, namely a parody. But the 
overall tenor of the opinion went beyond that distinction to reject the notion of 
certain and sharp rules in fair use. 
Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
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shown a deliberate preference for an equitable standard over 
specific rules. 
B. Copyright's unusual mid-range status 
At first blush, it is surprising to find American copyright 
law placing at the virtual center of a plaintiff's case the 
distinctively nonformal principles of "substantiality" and 
"fairness." After all, copyright is a form of property, and 
copyists always act volitionally and deliberately. (For example, 
they know they are publicly performing, or using the photocopy 
machine, or playing music on their guitar, even if they don't 
know that they are copying someone else while doing so.) It 
seems most logical that such a volitional trespass should be 
treated under a formal rule, as are other non-accidental 
violations of property rights. The mere act of nonconsensual 
copying is arguably like the mere act of stepping onto someone 
else's land without permission, and arguably should give rise to 
similar liability. So why is this not the case? 
Economics does not yield an immediate answer. The 
classic article by Calabresi and Melamed61 tells us that 
intentional takings of property are prima facie wrongful because 
people should not depart from the market without a strong 
justification. Their article tells us that accident law uses a 
"reasonableness" inquiry because, in accidents, such a 
justification is present: the participants cannot bargain with each 
other in advance. Before a driver chooses to drive down a 
particular street at 35 miles per hour, neither she nor the 
pedestrian with whom she may accidentally collide on that 
street, has any reason to know that they need to deal with each 
other. In the presence of such complete market failure, we are 
told, the court "mimics the market" through a negligence 
inquiry, trying to determine whether the parties behaved 
efficiently and imposing liability accordingly. 
60 
61 
17 U.S.C. Section 107, last sentence. 
See Guido CALABRESI & A. Douglas MELAMED, "Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral", (1975) 85 
Harv. L. Rev. 1089. 
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But in copyright the "substantiality" inquiry and the 
"fair use" doctrine are both available regardless of whether the 
copyright owner and the copyist have complete knowledge of 
each other's identity and are otherwise able to bargain. Thus, in 
the most recent "fair use" case to reach the United States 
Supreme Court, the parties had the requisite knowledge and 
transaction costs were minimal. Defendant, the rap group "2 
Live Crew," had in fact offered the copyright owners 
compensation in exchange for permission to make a parody of 
their song, "Oh, Pretty Woman." The copyright owners simply 
refused to give the rap group permission. 
This hardly looks like market failure - the two parties 
were virtually face to face. Yet the Supreme Court indicated 
that fair use might nevertheless be available to shield the makers 
of the parody from liability. 62 How, then, can such a doctrine be 
squared, either with usual American patterns of tort and 
property law, or with economic notions of market failure? 
The answer lies in the imperfection of intellectual 
property as a response to the "public goods" problem. At least 
in the absence of perfect price discrimination, 63 obtaining 
adequate incentives for production will necessarily involve a 
price that is set above marginal cost, and thus a quantity 
produced that is below the quantity that would be produced by a 
competitive market. Market imperfection is present in even the 
most pristine copyright transaction. The issue is how legal 
institutions cure the imperfections caused by excludability 
without losing the benefits excludability brings. 
62 
63 
See Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music Inc., supra, note 17. The case was 
remanded for further proceedings in light of the Supreme Court opinion that, 
inter alia, made clear the copyright owner's refusing to license should not 
weigh against a fair use finding. See id. (parodists are unlikely to be able to 
obtain consents). See also id. at 585 n.18 ("we reject Acuff Rose's argument 
that 2 Live Crew's request for permission to use the original should be 
weighed against a fair use finding."). 
See Harold DEMSETZ, 'Tue Private Production of Public Goods", (1970) 13 
J.L. & Econ. 293. Copyright itself can be seen as enabling a form of price 
discrimination. See Wendy J. GORDON, "Intellectual Property as Price 
Discrintination: Implications for Contract," (1998) 73 Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 1367; also see Michael J. MEURER, "Price Discrimination, Personal 
Use and Privacy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works," (1997) 45 Buff. L. 
Rev. 845. 
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Or, one can put the same matter in non-economic 
normative terms. Copying is not necessarily wrongful. It is how 
we learn, 64 it can be both harmless and beneficial,65 and it is the 
essence of having a common culture.66 Therefore it would be 
absurd to make all copiers prima facie liable as infringers. 
The trick is to find some means to distinguish wrongful 
from fair copying. Some of those means are case-by-case, like 
"substantial similarity" and "fair use." Some are system-wide 
rules, like the provisions limiting the duration of copyrights and 
patents. 
But the use of vague standards is probably what stands 
most in need of explanation. The employment of these standards 
is, in my view, largely due to the lost promise of 
inexhaustability, coupled with the speed of technological 
change that characterizes the copyright industries in the last 
century. Since copying of an intangible is often harmless, a "fair 
use" and "substantial similarity" standard permit socially useful 
experimentation. And since such experimentation may be 
blocked by transaction costs, and these costs can change 
quickly, "fair use" allows the courts to adapt. 67 
64 
65 
66 
67 
See Benjamin KAPLAN, An Unhurried View of Copyright(l967). 
If copying is harmless, allowing copying produces a Pareto-superior result: no 
one is hurt and the copyist and her customers gain. 
See W. J. GORDON, "On Owning Information : Intellectual Property and the 
Restitutionary Impulse", loc. cit., note l; W. J. GORDON, "Property Right in 
Self-Expression", loc. cit., note 54. 
W. J. GORDON, loc. cit., note 34 at 1656-1657; also see American 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F 3d 913 (2d Cir 1995), cert. denied 
516 S Ct 1005 (1995) (photocopying held not fair use because, inter alia, 
licensing through the Copyright Clearance Center would have been feasible). 
Note, moreover, that transaction cost baniers between copier and copyright 
owner are only one of many forms of market failure relevant to fair use. For 
example, uses such as criticism generate positive externalities, and this is one 
reason why a critic's extensive use of quotation is potentially entitled to fair 
use treatment, "Fair Use as Market Failure," at 1630-1631. Further, "fair use" 
is also used to address uses that should not be owned (or commodified) at all, 
id. at 1631-1632, such as uses that implicate non-monetizable free speech 
concerns. 
The importance of providing a safe harbor for critics may be obvious and 
stable enough to be recognized in a rule, as the Canadian "fair dealing" statute 
has done. But is is not so easy to reduce to a rule the many ways in which the 
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All that being said, however, it is still true that 
Copyright law places on the public a duty to refrain from certain 
uses of others' labor, while Restitution takes the opposite 
starting point. It will be useful to employ basic economics to 
understand why Copyright law begins with a presumption of 
liability (subject to an equitably-expressed exception for "fair" 
uses) while Restitution begins with a presumption of no liability 
(subject to an equitably-expressed exception for "unjust" 
enrichment). 
C. Comparing Copyright and Restitution 
Restitution doctrine provides that persons whose labor 
makes others better off will ordinarily have no legal recourse if 
they labor without advance agreement. Yet intellectual product 
producers can sue to obtain payment for the "fruits of their 
labor" from copyists who never agreed to pay. This has led 
some observers to view some forms of intellectual property as 
unjustifiable. 68 Since Restitution law contains no presumption 
that there should be recovery for benefits generated, it forms a 
useful contrast with copyright. 69 
68 
69 
"fair use" doctrine can be used to investigate issues such as non-
monetizability of the interests at stake in a particular case. When the question 
before the court is the normative inapplicability of the whole market 
apparatus, a flexible standard is (I argue) the best way to proceed, at least until 
a societal consensus has formed. 
Note that the issues embraced by "fair use" cases can include issues of 
commodificaiton. This essay broached those issues earlier, in relation to the 
statutory declaration that "ideas" cannot be owned under United States 
copyright law. 17 U.S.C. Section 102(b). In the middle of the century, the 
overlap between "fair use" and the non-ownership of "ideas" was visible in 
the language courts used, for a defendant who used a copyright owner's 
"ideas" was said to be engaged in a 1'fair use". 
Thus Murray Rothbard argues that intellectual property is legitimate only to 
the extent that it can be analogized to consent. See Murray N. ROTHBARD, 
Man, Economy and State. A Treatise on Economic Principles, Auburn, 
Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2nd ed., 1993, 652-660 (1962). 
Under American copyright law, the work's creator has a right to exclusively 
control the rights of reproduction, copying, adaptation, performance and the 
like, see 17 U.S.C. Section 106. She can extract monies and obtain injunctions 
when someone does these things without permission. 
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First, consider a homely example to illustrate the 
different treatment a laborer without a contract will receive 
under the two areas of law. First, imagine someone paints the 
roof of a building while its owner is away. After the owner 
returns the painter presents himself at the door and says, "pay 
me for this wonderful benefit I have given you," pointing at the 
new paint job which (we will assume) has increased the value of 
the building. In such a situation, the building owner is entitled 
to say something quite rude. Next, in contrast, imagine that the 
home owner, using her own sweat and paint, does a mural on 
one of her building's exterior walls, copying onto it a painting 
which has a valid copyright. Perhaps the mural increases the 
value of the building more than a new coat of pure white paint 
would have; perhaps the mural is an eyesore. In either event, if 
the owner of the copyright comes to the door and says, "Pay me 
or I'm going to sue you for a very large amount of money," the 
building owner had better be very polite. 
In neither situation has the building owner agreed in 
advance to pay for use of the other's resource. Yet the 
photographer's labor embedded in a visual pattern must be paid 
for, and the painter's labor embedded in new roof pigment need 
not be. 
Do not jump too quickly to say that one of the pigments 
embodies property while the other merely embodies labor. 
Pretend for a moment there is no property in pictures, and that 
we have to return to basic common-law techniques to determine 
whether or not the author of the copied picture should be paid. 
To prevail in Restitution, persons whose voluntary 
actions provide benefits to others must ordinarily show one of a 
few very narrow justifications for departing from the market: 
mistake,70 coercion,71 request, 72 or a narrow range of exigent 
situations, such as danger to life and health. 73 Even then, their 
ability to recover will often be further restricted by the courts' 
70 
71 
72 
73 
Restatement of Restitution, supra, note 2, Sections 6-69. 
Id., Sections 70-106. 
Id., Sections 107-111. 
Id., Section 112. 
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desire to be sure that the defendant really was benefited and that 
forcing him to pay or disgorge will not leave him worse off than 
he would have been in the status quo ante.74 Similarly, the 
Restatement of Restitution is not hospitable to persons who 
generate benefits as a by-product of self-serving activity. Thus, 
the Restatement states that: "A person who, incidentally to the 
performance of his own duty or to the protection or 
improvement of his own things, has conferred a benefit upon 
another, is not thereby entitled to contribution."75 For example, 
a mine owner whose drainage efforts clear both her mine and 
her neighbor's mine of waters is not entitled to contribution 
from the neighbor. 76 
A person who writes a book and publishes it is certainly 
operating in the furtherance of his or her own interests. Except 
as to someone who has bargained with the author for production 
of the work (such as a patron, granting agency, employer, or 
contract-publisher), the author is a sort of volunteer. She is 
voluntarily taking the risk that putting her product on the market 
will bring her a profit. When a book is mass-marketed, many 
strangers will come across it. If a stranger makes copies of the 
book for sale, copyright law will give the author a right of 
action against the copyist even if the author "volunteered" to 
send the work into the stream of commerce. Since that right of 
action will be available whether or not the copyist had a 
contract with the author promising to refrain from copying, and 
whether or not the copyist's actions harm the author,77 it is clear 
that, under copyright law, a unilateral transfer of "benefits" will 
trigger liability. 
74 
75 
76 
77 
See, e.g., id. Section 40, cmt. b, at 109. 
Id., supra, note 43, Section 106. There are situations in which protecting 
one's own interests does not bar restitution, but these tend to be associated 
with coercion, as where a property owner discharges another's duty when that 
is the only way to prevent a third party from lawfnlly taking the property. Id., 
Sectioo 103. 
Id., Section 106, illus. 2. The result in this situation may vary if the neighbor 
can be said to have "freely accepted" the benefit. See Peter BIRKS, 
Introduction to the Law of Restitution. 
Sometimes the absence of harm may make it easier to obtain fair use 
treatment, however. See the fourth factor in 17 U.S.C. section 107, set out at 
footnote 54. 
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There are many reasons for the difference between the 
two fields' basic rules; one difference obviously lies in the 
active or passive role of the person using the benefit. That is not 
simply an issue of autonomy. Activity or passivity also has 
implications for market formation. To see this, consider what 
results would follow if a legally enforced right to payment were 
given to the claimants in the two situations. 
In the Restitution context, the active parties are the 
benefactors, the volunteers. Systematically allowing volunteers 
to sue for the benefits they have given would reduce their desire 
to make contracts with those who might want their services. 
Admittedly, the people who are the best at painting houses 
would have no desire to sneak around and do it behind the backs 
of their customers. However, the people who make messy jobs 
of it would probably start to paint and then ask for money after 
the fact - and could do so in disregard of whether the building 
owner preferred a different supplier, thus ruining the market 
even for those who would otherwise be willing to make 
contracts. In the volunteer context, then, a rule that encourages 
contract formation - and thus market formation - is a rule 
that denies to the benefit-generator (the potential volunteer) any 
right of recompense independent of contract. 78 If a volunteer 
thinks the law will not give restitution, then she will seek to 
make a bargain by asking the potential recipients for 
contributions before the project begins.79 
78 
79 
Even when there is a market failure in the restitution context, so that the 
potential benefactor and the potential recipient are unable to identify or 
negotiate with each other, there are only very few circumstances in which 
payment is ordered through the courts - mistake, request, coercion and a 
narrow range of emergencies justify recovery. lbis narrowness of recovery in 
the restitution context reflects the fact that if we give the benefit-generator a 
right to legally enforce recompense, it would tend to erode markets. See 
LEVMORE, loc. cit., note 38. 
Many examples exist of "internalizing benefits" by contract. Thus, in many 
shopping malls, where small stores are likely to benefit from the propinquity 
of large department stores that draw masses of customers, the small stores 
may be willing to pay extra rent to subsidize the larger stores' entry. 
Something like this also happens in oil exploration: neighboring lessees will 
learn a great deal about whether or not it is worthwhile to drill under their 
own land from the results of their neighbor's drilling. So "dry hole 
contribution agreements" have come into being: contracts by which the 
neighbor who stands to benefit from the information agrees to pay a share of 
his neighbor's drilling costs should the hole come up dry. 
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In the intellectual property context, the likely impact of a 
right to recover is quite the opposite.80 This occurs largely 
because the identity of the active party - and thus the party 
who has superior access to information, who is otherwise better 
able to enter transactions, and who is better situated to respond 
to the law's messages - is different there. 
In the volunteer context, the recipient may be ignorant 
until the deed is done. It is the benefactor - like the house 
painter - who has the greater access to information; he knows 
where and when he will act. In restitution, the rule of law that 
speaks to this active party and encourages him to seek out 
consensual market arrangements is therefore a rule of "no 
monetary recovery without contract." In the intellectual 
property situation, by contrast, the recipient-copyist is the active 
party: he can better initiate the transaction. After all, the copyist 
knows what he is copying, whereas the plaintiff-owner may be 
hundreds of miles away and have no idea copying is being 
contemplated. The copyist will also find it fairly easy to identify 
the author or copyright owner from the by-line, while the 
copyright owner has no such source of information. 
80 
Similarly, assume that landowners are likely to benefit from a venture like a 
resort complex locating nearby, but the resort is so expensive to build that it 
cannot afford many externalized benefits - e.g., it will come to the area only 
if it is subsidized by the existing landowners or can itself capture most of the 
benefits generated. Even in such a case there may be no need to allow the 
resort complex to sue the benefited owners, after the fact, in restitution. The 
developers can try to persuade these neighbors, in advance, to pay them 
something to encourage them to build nearby. Admittedly, there could be 
hold-out problems and other strategic maneuvering making this difficult. So 
the active party has another option: the owner of an attraction could quietly 
buy the land on which the beneficial spillovers will fall. This is apparently 
what the Disney organization did with Epcot and Disney World: it bought up 
surrounding land and built on it enough hotels and restaurants to capture much 
of the benefit their tourist attraction generates. Where this is possible, benefits 
are again internalized without the need for restitution suits. 
This is explored at greater length in W. J. GORDON, "Of Harms and 
Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property'', loc. cit., note I, and in 
W. J. GORDON, "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the 
Restitutionary Impulse", loc. cit., note 1. 
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Even if the author can identify the potential copyists, she 
faces strong strategic behavior problems in making them pay.81 
A baseline rule that denied copyright - that gave a benefit-
generator no recovery unless he had a prior contract with the 
copyist - would leave the party with the best ability to contract 
(the copyist) with little motive to do so. He would probably 
prefer to free ride. Therefore, the law has to give the benefit-
generators (the copyright owners) a right of recovery 
independent of contract. 
Both restitution and intellectual property law give the 
party who has the information and ability to internalize the 
incentive to do so. The party simply happens to be different in 
restitution than in intellectual property. In each case, legal rights 
are arranged to facilitate the consensual transfers of resources. 
81 In a world without intellectual property rights, an author may want to bargain 
with her audience for payment, but the audience is likely to be a wide and 
uncertain one, and the benefits are those that will flow from an as yet 
undisclosed intellectual product. Even if the author could somehow identify 
all the potential recipients, it would be expensive and awkward to reach 
simultaneously all of the persons who will eventually want access to the work. 
Even if this were possible, what would happen when the creator tried to 
negotiate for a payment from them all in exchange for disclosing the work? 
Many of those audience members might be tempted to hold back in the hope 
that others' monies would be sufficient to draw the work into the marketplace 
where they could then make a cheap copy. The larger the group of potential 
purchasers, the better the odds on the gamble may seem. Also, the work's 
contents are largely unknown at this stage; the less certsin the benefits, the 
less seems to be risked if the gamble does not pay off. Good odds in favor of 
winning, and low perceived cost in the event of a loss, make the gamble very 
tempting. If enough people take this gamble in the hope of taking a free ride, 
the requisite funds may not be forthcoming. "Chicken," "prisoner's dilemma," 
and other free rider games illustrate analogous dynamics. 
The presence of a publisher does not much alter the desirability of granting 
intellectual property rights to resolve potential bargaining stalemates. 
Admittedly, in a world without intellectual property rights the author may find 
it easier to deal with a publisher than with an undifferentiated audience (only 
one party; low transaction costs), but then the publisher must deal with the 
audience. The author's problems with information, transaction costs, and free 
riders would simply be passed on, one step further down the line. How much 
would a publisher pay for a book that could be lawfully copied by all comers 
once it appeared on the market? Unless the publisher has a lead-time 
advantage or some other sort of real-world clout that can discourage copying, 
the rate the publisher would offer the author in such a world might be too low. 
If the anticipated rate of payment is low, otherwise-desirable works may not 
be created. 
92 LES CERTITIJDES DU DROIT - CERTAINTY AND TIIE LAW 
The party best positioned to alter the use to which a resource is 
put82 is required to do so by a systemic choice of a liability or 
no-liability rule. 83 
The centerpoint of intellectual property liability appears 
in the copyright and patent statutes as a grant to the proprietor 
of rights to exclusive use. 84 Note that the rule setting up liability 
appears to be a sharp-edged and certain grant. As with all sharp-
edged rules, it may be over-inclusive. Thus, although the 
rationale of the rule depends on the potential printer or copyist 
being an active party who can knowledgeably seek out bargains, 
copyright law also makes a publisher liable if, in good faith, she 
prints a copyrighted work which a plagiarizer has submitted. 
The law might even make a passive recipient liable. For 
example, assume that a painting duplicating a copyrighted work 
is put on the exterior wall of a house not by the building's 
owner, but by a skilled prankster. In that case, the householder 
is a passive recipient, rather than an active user (as is more 
typical in intellectual property cases). Nevertheless, he may be 
liable. Assume for example that the reproduction draws 
attention to the house so that the householder can sell the 
building for an amount in excess of the value of otherwise 
similar homes. If the owner in fact does sell, he will likely be 
82 
83 
84 
This is a variation of the phenomenon Dean Calabresi referred to as looking 
for the "best briber." Guido CALABRESI, The Costs of Accidents; a legal 
and economic analysis. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970. 
Markets can yield efficiency only where resources can practicably be 
transferred to their highest-valued uses. See R. H. COASE, "The Problem of 
Social Cosf', (1960) 3 J. L. & Econ. I. 
For copyright law in the U.S., see 17 U.S.C. Section 106 (giving exclusive 
rights over the reproduction, distribution, public performance, adaptation, etc., 
of the copyrighted work of authorship); for patent law in the U.S., see 35 
U.S.C. Sections 101 et seq. (giving exclusive rights over making, using, 
selling, offering to sell, or importing, the patented invention.) 
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guilty of infringing the copyright owner's exclusive rights over 
the distribution of copies. 85 Such over-inclusion can be costly. 
ill. Systemic intellectual property rules to 
minimize market imperfections 
Rules are not only used to enhance tradability. They are 
also used to distinguish between areas where legal protection is 
desirable and areas in which it is not. Industries may exist where 
perhaps the need for government to provide exclusion rights is 
less (because there is no significant market failure under copy-
liberty), or uses which are more expensive to restrict, or other 
areas where the costs of copyright might outweigh its value. 
Thus, copyright distinguishes among subject matters. Not all 
beneficial products of human ingenuity are capable of being 
owned. Differing treatment exists for computer programs, 
musical compositions, literary works, architecture, recorded oral 
presentations - each has some specialized rules in the statute. 
Further the Copyright Act grants ownership only in works of 
authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression,86 and even 
among such works the act denies protection to whole classes 
(such as ideas, and typographic designs)87 which, presumably, 
85 
86 
87 
Under section 106(3), only the owner of the copyright has the right to 
distribute copies. Although the first sale doctrine (see section 109) provides an 
exception that allows the owners of lawfully made copies to distribute them 
without liability. the house owner in our example does not own a copy that 
was "lawfully made". Therefore he could not take shelter under the first sale 
doctrine, and his sale of the house would constitute an unlawful "distribution" 
of the copy painted upon it. 
Public display is also one of the copyright owner's exclusive entitlements. 17 
U.S.C. Section 106(5). Even without a sale, it is possible that an irritated 
copyright owner could bring a successful suit merely for the house owner's 
continued ''public display" of the work. However, I suspect that, in such a 
case, a court might read into the copyright statute a requirement that the 
defendant act volitionally. (A suit premised on sale of the house - sale being 
a volitional act - would not be as vulnerable.) 
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. Sections 102, 103. 
Section 102(6) denies copyright to, inter alia, ideas and processes. As for 
typographic designs lacking protection, this is a matter of legislative history; 
the statute itself does not explicitly mention typography. See House Report, 
supra, note 55, at 53-57. The reason protection was not given to typographic 
design may have been a fear that such protection might be misused by 
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would prove more costly than beneficial to propertize. 88 
Similarly, copyright does not give owners of copyright a right to 
control all uses of their works. Rather, they have control over 
certain kinds of enumerated uses - those uses whose control is 
desirably centralized in one entity. Thus, for example, the 
composer of a song has exclusive rights over reproduction and 
public performance, but not over private performance. 89 
There are also system-wide rules that work to decrease 
the system's costs, and to take better advantage of intangibles' 
inexhaustability. The key example here is that of duration. 9Cl 
To see this, we must backtrack to consider a conceptual 
matter. At one point, lawyers foundered when asked how to 
assess, even conceptually, the value of an intellectual property 
system. The empirical questions are hard enough, but there 
appeared to be a paradox where deadweight loss was concerned. 
True, the exclusive right that the copyright or patent owner 
receives from the law confers a kind of monopoly power (of 
varying effectiveness, depending on the competing intellectual 
products available to the audience.)91 Also true, this monopoly 
power can then cause deadweight loss as the intellectual 
property owner imposes a price above marginal cost and the 
quantity effectively available to the public is reduced. But 
lawyers were hard put to assess the significance of this 
deadweight loss, because the work to which access was being 
reduced by the intellectual property law might never have come 
into existence without that very law. 
88 
89 
90 
91 
reprinters as a way to fence off public domain literature such as Shakespeare 
or the Bible. 
Industry pressures undoubtedly play a role here as well. 
For more on the role of copyright's particular provisions, see W. J. GORDON, 
"Merits of Copyright", loc. cit., note 3, and W. J. GORDON, "Fair Use as 
MarketFailure", loc. cit., note 34, at 1605-1615. 
In the discussion of duration that follows I am indebted to the work of Stanley 
Liebowitz. See, e.g., S. J. LIEBOWITZ, Zoe. cit., note 32, at 183-188. 
That is, the person who owns copyright in a particular book will have a 
monopoly over that book, but not over competing titles by other authors. 
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The way out of this apparent paradox was to make a 
conceptual distinction between those works which needed the 
intellectual property law to induce their authors to create them, 
and those works which did not. As to the former items, any 
production is due to the legal regime's grant of intellectual 
property rights. As to the latter items, the intellectual property 
law merely functions as a restriction.92 
Thus, one would credit the intellectual property system 
with all the value of the works that would not have come into 
existence without intellectual property rights. As to these works, 
any production of the item would count as a positive value, and 
restrictions on quantity would be irrelevant. Then, from this 
aggregate positive value would be deducted the deadweight loss 
in markets for works that would have been produced even in the 
absence of intellectual property rights.93 
The value of the intellectual property system is the net of 
these two numbers. As Professor Stanley Liebowitz has made 
clear,94 imposing system-wide durational limits - limiting how 
long particular types of intellectual property rights will last -
can serve to maximize this net value. 
First, as duration increases, the number of new works 
attributable to an additional period of protection will grow 
smaller. The usual law of diminishing marginal utility would 
seem to govern; as the duration of a copyright or patent is made 
longer and longer, the incentive effect of additional length is 
likely to decrease.95 To illustrate: extending the duration of 
92 
93 
94 
95 
The discussion here puts aside what Edmund Kitch calls "prospect effects," 
namely, those positive effects on ease of exploitation that can occur when 
property rights are centralized in one entity. See Edmund KITCH, "The 
Nature and Function of the Patent System'', (1977) WJ. Law & &on. 265. 
S. J. LIEBOWITZ, Joe. cit., note 32. 
His graphical representation is particularly helpful. See id. at 187. 
This point is probably made most wittily by Lord Macaulay, in his speeches 
before the British parliament protesting their extending the duration of 
copyright Lord Macaulay argued that while copyright might be necessary to 
ensure a "supply of good books," the monopoly that it imposed was at best a 
necessary evil. "For the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the 
evil ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of 
securing the good." Thomas MACAULAY, "Speech Before the House of 
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copyright from one year to five is likely to so increase the 
expected rewards of writing a book or designing a poster that 
the increase will induce some new works to be made which 
would not otherwise be created. By contrast, extending the 
duration from 101 years to 105 is not likely to have as strong an 
effect, so such further extensions will bring less to the "plus" 
side of the ledger. 
Second, as duration increases, more and more works will 
not "need" the extra years to come into existence. As the reader 
will recall, years of protection that are not needed for incentives 
constitute unnecessary restrictions, and as to them "deadweight 
loss" should be counted on the debit side of the social ledger. 
For example, works which were called into existence by the 
promise of a 56-year reward are "pluses" to be credited to the 
copyright system for only their first 56 years. The copyright 
system's grant of exclusive rights for years 57 and following 
would deserve no credit for those works' creation. Equally 
importantly, any deadweight loss in markets in years 57 and 
following becomes a cost attributable to copyright. 
Thus, as duration grows longer, the incentive value of an 
added durational restriction grows less, and the deadweight loss 
grows larger. The economic goal in choosing a durational limit 
is to maximize the difference between the two measures, 
incentive value and deadweight loss. Thus, duration can be 
custom-designed, providing a set of categorical sharp rules that 
limit the periods of protection for intangibles protected by a 
given regime, such as the seventeen to twenty years that U.S. 
law gives to utility patents,96 as compared with the fourteen 
years of design patents,97 the "life plus seventy years" that 
inheres in most copyrights,98 or the ten years of protection 
applicable to semiconductor chip mask works.99 These various 
Commons" (Feb. 5, 1841), in 8 The Works of Lord Macaulay 195, 199 (Lady 
Trevelyan ed. 1866) (discussing a bill which would have extended the 
duration of copyright protection). 
96 35 U.S.C. Sections 154-157. 
97 35 U.S.C. Section 173. 
98 17 U.S.C. Sections 302-305. There is a different duration for works made for 
hire, etc. 
99 17 U.S.C. Section 904. 
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systemic limits can function to minimize the cost attributable to 
deadweight loss. 
IV. Using standards to minimize market 
imperfections: turning to the fair use doctrine 
and the question of parody 
Sometimes markets do not evolve for a particular 
creative work or use - say, for example, that bargaining is 
impeded by problems such as externalities, or high transaction 
costs in identifying or communicating with the copyright 
proprietor. If the copyright laws prohibited copying in that area 
it could simply be preventing copying without yielding creators 
any monetary advantage. That would be undesirable. Not only 
would copyright then fail to perform its primary function, but if 
users cannot reach market deals with creators, copyright would 
impose more costs and generate less benefit than would a 
regime without copyright. For though incentives may be low in 
a world without copyright, at least copyists and other users 
would have access to whatever works happened to be created; 
by contrast, in a world where there is copyright but no markets, 
incentives are low and the public has no access. Therefore, as 
discussed in the initial sections of this article, the ability of users 
to form markets is crucial to copyright's economic mission of 
encouraging the production and use of new work. 
This observation has implications for policy in 
individual cases. If a defendant faces market failure in the face 
of copyright, then, in his case, the economic foundation for 
copyright has crumbled. That is a good argument (if not a 
complete one) for not enforcing the copyright against him. 
Further, it can be argued that "fair use" has evolved as an 
equitable response to market failure, to ensure that socially 
desirable uses will not be blocked. loo 
100 I have advanced this argument in W. J. GORDON, "Fair Use as Market 
Failure", loc. cit., note 34, 1614-1615, 1627-1641. For further development, 
see id. at 1614-1657 (proposing a 3-part test for fair use, aud comparing such 
test with the case law results) aud W. J. GORDON, Private Censorship, loc. 
cit., note 1, 1042-1043 (1990) . See also, e.g., W. M. LANDES & R. A. 
POSNER, loc. cit., note 32; Sheldon LIGHT, "Parody, Burlesque aud the 
Economic Rationale for Copyright", (1979) 11 Conn. L. Rev. 615. 
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For example, consider photocopying by individual 
scholars. The transaction costs in contacting a copyright owner 
for permission to photocopy might well outweigh the benefit the 
scholar expects to reap. 101 In such a case, enforcing the 
copyright would merely eliminate the photocopying, rather than 
generate any license fees for the copyright owner. In such an 
event, 102 granting "fair use" treatment to the scholar will not 
impair the copyright owner's potential income stream, and will 
allow a socially beneficial use to go forward that the transaction 
costs barrier would otherwise have blocked. High transaction 
costs are, of course, a classic cause of market failure. 
The market failure approach is consistent with the great 
bulk of "fair use" precedent, 103 and in recent years this sort of 
argument has even found its way into the courts' explicit 
arguments. For example, in a recent fair use case involving 
corporate photocopying of scientific journals, the courts clearly 
had a market failure model in mind. The opinions of both the 
District Court and Court of Appeals discuss what economists 
identify as "transaction costs," and examine the extent to which 
the defendant's employees - if required to stop 
photocopying - could find other avenues through which to 
obtain the desired materiai.104 
Similarly, in the most recent fair use case before the 
Supreme Court, the opinion indicated that "fair use" can be 
justified in part as a response to situations in which copyright 
owners are unlikely to give permission at virtually any price.105 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
That is, even if the scholar were willing and able to pay whatever price the 
copyright owner demanded, the scholar might not be willing to both pay that 
price plus bear the time delay, hassle, and secretarial costs involved in 
securing a permission. 
Note that this analysis is dependent upon the relative size of the applicable 
transaction cost barrier. If a clearinghouse or compulsory license system 
exists which reduces the transaction costs, then the scholar may not require 
fair use treatment in order to allow her use to go forward. 
See W. J. GORDON, "Fair Use as Market Failnre",loc. cit., note 34, at 1627-
1636. 
See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992), aff'd, 60 F. 2d 93, 929-931 (2d Cir. 1994). 
See Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music Inc., supra, note 17. In assessing the 
plaintiffs' claim that the parody would impair their potential market, the Court 
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This position, advanced in a case involving a song parody, 
might strike the reader as inconsistent with the usual assumption 
of neoclassical economics that one must take preferences as a 
given. 
If one takes this assumption seriously - it is sometimes 
known as the assumption of "consumer sovereignty" - then it 
seems the Court should have accorded to the copyright owner's 
desire not to be parodied as much respect as any other value. 
After all, in theory, an unwillingness to sell or license merely 
indicates that the potential buyer/licensee is not the highest-
valued user. And in many countries, such as Canada, an 
unwillingness to allow one's work to be copied in a distorted 
manner is given more, rather than less, respect than a refusal to 
sell motivated by ordinary commercial reasons.106 
106 
responded: "[T]he unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license 
critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from 
the very notion of a potential licensing market" Id., at 592. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made a similar point in Fisherv. Dees, 
794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The parody defense to copyright infringement 
exists precisely to make possible a use that generally caonot be bought."). For 
other cases involving similar anti-dissemination motives on the part of 
copyright proprietors, see W. J. GORDON, "Fair Use as Market Failore", loc. 
cit., note 34, at 1632-1633. 
Canada's moral rights statute is complex. Analysis can fruitfully begin at 
Copyright Act, supra, note 19, section 14.1 (1985) (Can.) which provides: 
"Moral rights 
14.1 (1) The author of a work has, subject to section 28.2, the right to the 
integrity of the work and, in connection with an act mentioned in section 3, 
the right, where reasonable in the circumstances, to be associated with the 
work as its author by name or under a pseudonym and the right to remain 
anonymous." 
By contrast, the United States copyright law provides a right of integrity to 
only a narrow class of visual artwork, usually otiginals. See 17 U.S.C. Section 
106. The U.S. moral right is subject to "fair use" in a way that the Canadian 
moral right does not seem to be subject to ''fair dealing." 
To parody would be to distort, and, since it might very well injore an author's 
reputation, might violate the Canadiao moral right of integrity. The statute 
provides: 
"Natore of right of integrity 
28.2 (1) The author's right to the integrity of a work is infringed only if the 
work is, to the prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author, 
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So it may seem wrongheaded of the United States 
Supreme Court to suggest that it may be appropriate to give a 
parodist - a disappointed licensee - the liberty to copy for 
free on the ground that the owner would not sell him a license. 
Is the Court under-valuing the owner's preferences? Not 
necessarily; there are several explanations of the Court's 
approach that are consistent with the traditional economic 
deference to individual preferences. In fact, economics suggests 
that a rule like Canada's that defers to an author's copyright or 
her supposed "moral right of integrity" will yield results that are 
(administrative costs aside) inferior to a case-by-case approach 
which tolerates some parodies - however insulting the 
parodies might be to an artist whose work is being intentionally 
distorted and mocked. 
Canada, like the United States, gives fair use or fair 
dealing to works of criticism or review. I shall argue that 
parodies fall into the same analytic class, and should be treated 
similarly. 
When a copyright owner refuses to let someone adapt 
her work for purposes of parodying it, or refuses to give an 
ideological opponent permission to quote lengthy passages, or 
insists on suing anyone who quotes passages of her memoirs 
that reflect unfavorably on her, she is using her copyright as a 
(a) distorted, mutilated or otherwise modified; or 
(b) used in association with a product, service, cause or institution. 
Where prejudice deemed 
(2) In the case of a painting, sculpture or engraving, the prejudice referred 
to in subsection (1) shall be deemed to have occurred as a result of any 
distortion, mutilation or other modification of the work. 
When work not distorted, etc. 
(3) For the puiposes of this section, 
(a) a change in the location of a work, the physical means by which a work 
is exposed or the physical structure containing a work, or 
(b) steps taken in good faith to restore or preserve the work shall not, by 
that act alone, constitute a distortion, mutilation or other modification of the 
work." 
R.S., 1985, c. 10 (4th Supp.), s. 6. 
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tool of suppression.107 The question of whether authors should 
be entitled to refuse pennission to those users of whom they 
disapprove is a complex one.108 On which side of the issue 
would economics weigh in? If the proper way to look at these 
problems is economic, then, as mentioned, the principles of 
consumer sovereignty would seem to dictate that governmental 
decision-makers should not question why someone refuses to 
sell or license. Economics "assum[es] that man is a rational 
maximizer of his ends in life,"109 and a desire to suppress would 
seem to be as rational an end as a desire for fame or fast cars. 
Additionally, Ronald Coase has persuasively 
emphasized the importance of transaction costs by showing that, 
in their absence, the ultimate allocation of a resource will be 
efficient regardless of how entitlements are initially assigned. no 
107 
108 
109 
llO 
Similar instances also appear in the corporate realm. For example, when a 
newspaper expanded its TV coverage it told its readership about the extended 
service in an advertisement that pictured a copyrighted TV Guide cover for 
purposes of comparison. TV Guide then sued for copyright infringement. 
Presumably the suit was motivated by something other than a desire for 
license fees. The comparative advertising was held to be a fair use. See 
Triangle Publicatiom Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers Inc., 626 F. Supp. 
1171 (5th Cir. 1980). 
For example, it can be difficult to distinguish suppression from an attempt to 
direct the work into the most valuable derivative work markets. See, e.g., Paul 
GOLDSTEIN, Copyright, Vol. I, at 571-573 (rights over derivative works can 
affect the direction of investment and the type of works produced). 
Similarly, in regard to unpublished works, it can be difficult to distinguish 
cases of suppression from cases of economically motivated refusals to license. 
An author accused of suppression may be simply trying to keep the work out 
of the public eye temporarily until it reaches its mature form and can be 
published. 
Even if some practical means existed to distinguish all dissembling 
"suppressors" from those copyright owners who are genuinely motivated by 
financial return, some cases will present instances of truly mixed motives. For 
example, the owner of copyright in an out-of-print collection of letters might 
sue a biographer who extensively quotes the letters, not only out of a dislike 
for the biographer's message or perceived inaccuracies, but also out of a 
desire to preserve the reprint market for the letters. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 
417 F. Supp. 1201, 1208 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 520 F. 2d 1061 
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). 
Richard A. POSNER, &onomic Analysis of Law, 3d ed., 1986. 
See R. H. COASE, "The Problem of Social Cost", loc. cit., note 83. The 
Coase Theorem is effective at least in the absence of factors such as 
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So long as the parties can meet face to face, as in copyright a 
copyright owner and potential parodist or critic could often do, 
why should there be any need for the judiciary to do anything 
but enforce whatever property right is before it? 
Whether suppression would or would not be 
economically desirable will depend in most cases on empirical 
analysis of the particular fact pattem. lll But some general 
observations can indicate preliminarily why, when copyright 
owners seek to use the copyright law to avoid criticism or 
ridicule, neither consumer sovereignty nor the Coase Theorem 
suggest that judges should give the owners formal deference.112 
At least four reasons suggest that the market cannot 
always be relied upon to mediate attempts at suppression and 
that it might be economically desirable to refuse authors an 
entitlement to suppress. 113 The four reasons are the 
"suppression triangle"; pecuniary effects; managerial discretion; 
and endowment effects. The four reasons are interrelated, and to 
explicate them let me begin with the "suppression triangle." 
111 
112 
113 
transaction costs, wealth or income effects, and strategic behavior. See id. 
(transaction costs). See also, e.g., Donald REGAN, "The Problem of Social 
Cost Revisited", (1972) 15 J. Law & Econ. 427 (strategic behavior). Compare 
Ronald H. COASE, "Notes on the Problem of Social Cost", in The Firm, the 
Market, and the Law, Chicago, University Chicago Press, 1988, pp. 157, 170-
174 (suggesting that income effects are unlikely to be significant, at least in 
contexts not involving irreplaceable goods). 
Even if one interprets copyright's economic goal as being solely the use of 
incentives to "promote knowledge," so that satisfying the copyright owner's 
personal tastes would not count as an independent value, the empirical answer 
to suppression questions would not be easy: in a given case enforcing any 
particular type of suppression would both keep some knowledge secret, and 
yield long-term incentives that could aid knowledge in the long run (because 
authors who can suppress have a copyright worth more than authors who 
cannot). Cf, Frank I. MICHELMAN, "Property, Utility & Fairness'', (1967) 
80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (the effects of demoralization on productivity). Which 
of the two potential effects on knowledge would be greater (the loss from 
enforcing suppression or the gain from long-term incentives) cannot be 
determined a priori. 
For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Wendy J. GORDON, "The Right Not 
to Use" (unpublished manusctipt on file with the author). 
Additional reasons otigbt include, e.g., the potential nonmonetizability of first 
amendment values. See W. J. GORDON, "Fair Use as Market Failure", We. 
cit., note 34, at 1631-1632. 
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In all these examples, remember: so long as there is the 
possibility that the social interest will be better served by 
refusing to enforce the owner's copyright, an economic case is 
made for using a nonformal, reasonableness mode of inquiry. 
One would then need to compare the costs of the extra 
suppression that would result from adhering to a formal pro-
owner result, with the administrative and other costs that would 
be necessary in employing a "reasonableness" or "fairness" 
standard. In the United States, with its strong history of prizing 
free speech, the costs of improper suppression of news or 
cultural material is viewed as very high. 
A. Suppression Triangle 
I use the term "suppression triangle"114 to point to the 
fact that in cases involving the suppression of information or 
other intellectual products,115 at least three parties are affected: 
(1) the person who seeks or threatens to make the contested use 
(for example, the potential parodist), (2) the copyright owner 
who wants to keep the material from being copied or adapted 
(the potential suppressor), and (3) the person or persons who 
would want to see the material (the potential recipients). This is 
the triangle of affected interests. Yet in the suppression 
transaction typically only two parties are present: the potential 
user (such as a parodist), and the copyright owner. Whether an 
attempt to suppress is likely to be value-maximizing will 
depend, inter alia, on how well the interest of the omitted third 
party, the class of potential recipients, is represented by the two 
immediate participants. 
114 
115 
I base this theory in part on the work of James Lindgren in the blackmail area. 
See James LINDGREN, "Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail", (1984) 84 
Colum. L. Rev. 670 (discussing the three-party structure involved). For an 
economic analysis of blackmail stressing other aspects of blackmail activity, 
see Ronald H. COASE, "The 1987 Mccorkle Lecture: Blackmail", (1988) 74 
Va. L. Rev. 655, 673-674. 
I am indebted to Warren Schwartz for suggesting the potential relevance of 
the blackmail literature to this problem. 
Information can implicate different issues from literary expression and other 
intellectual products; for purposes of this very general discussion, however, I 
shall group all together under the rubric "information." 
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Theoretically, the more valuable the parody or other use 
is to the public, the more the public should be willing to pay for 
it, and the more the parodist should be willing and able to bid 
for permission. Thus, the notion of the Invisible Hand expects 
that any market participant will be in a position to reflect the 
interests of affected third parties (that is, the public audience). 
Nevertheless, the Invisible Hand often falters, and the 
possibility of misallocation remains. 
Consider a hypothetical novelist or movie maker who 
wants to keep the world from knowing what a hostile critic or 
parodist has to say about his work. Assume also that the critic or 
parodist wants to quote from the work or use its imagery, and 
that use of the quotation or imagery is somehow essential to the 
comprehensibility or believability of the criticism or parody. 116 
If the law required the critic or parodist to purchase licenses to 
quote or paraphrase, how sure could we be that the "highest-
valued" use would ensue? 
For purposes of mathematical example, assume that the 
critic or parodist stands to earn at most a thousand dollars profit 
from even the best-written product. Assume that the novelist or 
film-maker would lose fifty thousand if the criticism or parody 
is published. Since the copyright owner would charge at least 
fifty thousand for a license to criticize or ridicule his work and 
the critic or parodist stands to gain only one thousand from 
publishing, it may look like the copyright owner holds the 
"highest valued" use when compared with the parodist or critic. 
But that may be an illusion resulting from the fact that the third 
party (in the owner/user/public triangle) is not being counted as 
part of the deal. 
116 There is another factor that may be at work here as well: the idea/expression 
dichotomy. Since under current law copyright owners cannot prevent others 
from using their ideas, it could be argued that little suppression of note could 
occur; it might be suggested that a critic deprived of the privilege to quote 
could nevertheless communicate effectively. 
For simplicity's sake, therefore, assume that in the following examples. 
whatever the defendant has taken from the first artist's work could be 
considered copyrightable expression rather than simply "idea" and that the use 
of the copyrighted expression is somehow essential to the effectiveness of the 
planned derivative work. 
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The publishing of the review or parody might benefit the 
public (who would thus be warned off from, let's say, a much-
hyped romance novel that doesn't really excite anyone who 
reads past page five) to the tune of that same fifty thousand, or 
perhaps even more. On these hypothesized facts, requiring the 
publisher to buy a license from someone who would not sell it is 
a bad idea, and giving the publisher (the critic or parodist) free 
use is a good idea. And both are consistent with economic 
measures of value. If the critic had been able to capture the full 
value that the review gave to the audience, then the novelist's 
fifty thousand minimum asking price would have been met. 
A parodist may similarly be unable to capture the full 
value that the work holds for the audience. This can occur for 
many reasons.117 There may be significant positive externalities 
and surplus in the market for parodies, for example. There also 
may be other complications in the markets for reviews and 
parodies, such as pecuniary losses that diverge from societal 
economic losses. 
B. Pecuniary losses 
Much of the loss that can come from a critical review 
will often be merely pecuniary, reflecting not a net loss to 
society but rather a shifting of revenues from one novelist to 
another and possibly better one. 118 It is as if the triangle now 
were a geometric figure with four points (the criticized novelist, 
the critic, the public, and the better novelist). If one could add to 
the price offered for the "license to criticize" an amount 
117 
118 
As economist Michael L. Katz writes of the shnilar problem in the research 
and development area: 
"In the absence of perfect discrimination, the firm conducting the R & D 
will be unable to appropriate all of the surplus generated by the licensing of 
its R & D, and the firm will sell its R & D results at prices that lead to 
inefficiently low levels of utilization by other firms." 
Michael L. KA 1Z, "An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Developmenf', 
(1986) 4Ran4J. &on. 527, 527. 
See Richard A. POSNER, "Conventionalist Defenses of Law as an 
Autonomous Discipline" (September 21, 1987) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with the University of Chicago Law Review) (using pecuniary effects to 
explain why landowners who create certain positive spillovers are not entitled 
to payment from those who benefited). 
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reflecting the monies that the better novelist would reap, it 
might be enough to make the difference. Since this cannot 
happen,119 mere pecuniary losses may take on an importance 
they should not have and they might prevent socially desirable 
licensing. 
C. Managerial discretion 
Another possible complication has to do not with the 
potential buyer's inability to raise the appropriate amount of 
capital, but with the potential licensor's potential inability to 
know even a good deal when it comes along. This complication 
I will label managerial discretion, 120 by which I mean to 
embrace all those things that may make managers in complex 
corporations sometimes arrive at decisions that are less value-
maximizing than they could be. I would include here, for 
example, personal risk aversion, bureaucratic structure, group 
dynamics, and laziness.121 Thus, the officials of a company that 
owns a given copyright may refuse to license simply because 
the license is in an unfamiliar field and their particular 
bureaucratic structure penalizes unlucky risk takers more than it 
rewards lucky ones. When critical, parodic, or otherwise 
controversial licenses would be at issue, the human desire to 
"play it safe" might prevent value-maximizing transfers from 
occurring.122 Managerial discretion is just one of many agency 
119 
120 
121 
122 
Journalistic ethics undoubtedly prohibit reviewers from accepting subsidies 
for doing hostile reviews. 
There is a fairly extensive literature on the controversial question of whether 
managerial discretion exists and if so what impact it has and what should be 
done about it; all I mean to suggest here is the simple possibility that 
managers in complex corporations do not always make the same decisions 
that an individual owner of a business would. 
In an individual, a taste for risk or laziness might be a legitimate part of her 
utility curve, but a manager is supposed to act uoselfishly on the part of the 
corporation. There is a large literature on these agency problems. 
It might be argued that tastes for laziness or risk aversion are simply 
preferences that deserve the same respect under the notion of consumer 
sovereignty as other desires. However, we are not talking here about the risk 
aversion or laziness of the copyright owner, but of some person who is 
fortuitously placed within the licensor organization to be able to control 
licensing decisions. Whether gratifying such a person's taste in regard to 
laziness or risk serves greater economic ends (as, e.g., a form of 
compensation) is itseH complex. 
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problems that can prevent the parties from dealing with each 
other like the unitary participants in the classic Coasian 
transaction. 
D. Endowment or wealth effects: pricelessness 
All of the above are reasons why socially desirable 
"licenses to be critical" are not likely to be granted if left solely 
to the devices of copyright owners.123 One additional and 
probably most important factor remains to be discussed: the 
difference between willingness to pay and willingness to sell, 
sometimes identified with "endowment" or "wealth" effects.124 
The concept here basically refers to the fact that giving 
someone an entitlement makes that person richer, and this may 
change how the holder values both the entitlement and other 
resources, and this in turn may affect how entitlements are 
eventually allocated once bargaining between that person and 
other persons is completed.125 Wealth effects do not retard 
resources from moving to hands in which, given a particular 
entitlement starting-point, they have the highest-valued use. Nor 
are they often strong enough to make a difference; in instances 
where fungible commodities are sold in markets populated by 
many buyers and sellers, "buy" prices and "sell" prices probably 
123 
124 
125 
Of cow-se, such licenses might be granted; I offer here only an abstract 
analysis which would need to be empirically verified. 
Wealth effects are, roughly, the impact on one's preferences brought about by 
a change in wealth, including the change brought about by being given, or 
being denied, an entitlement. See, e.g., E.J. MI SHAN, "The Postwar 
Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay", (1971) 9 J. Econ. 
Literature 1 (the allocative impact of wealth effects illustrated at 18-21, 
though not explicitly in the context of the Coase theorem). 
For an excellent numerical example, see id. at 18-21. It is well recognized that 
a divergence often exists between the price that a potential buyer would be 
willing to pay for a resource he does not own, and the price that the same 
person would demand before he would sell that same resource if the law had 
initially awarded its ownership to him. What is less clear is what terminology, 
explanations, and characterizations are best employed for discussing the 
phenomenon. For a valuable discussion suggesting, inter alia, that traditional 
"wealth effects" do not fully explain divergence between willingness-to-
accept and willingness-to-pay, see Elizabeth HOFFMAN & Matthew 
SPITZER, "Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and 
Economic Implications'', (1993) 71 Wash. U.L.Q. 59. 
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tend to converge. But, when wealth effects do have an impact, 
they have the potential of rendering the meaning of "highest-
valued" use indeterminate in the sense that the location of the 
highest-valued use is not independent of the law. Where wealth 
effects are strong, everything depends on the legal assignment 
of entitlements that form the transaction's starting point.126 As a 
result, in such cases the search for the highest-valued use cannot 
provide a good basis for assigning initial entitlements. 
Professor Coase showed that in a world without 
transaction costs, resources will be traded to their highest-
valued uses, so that, as between any two users of a resource, if 
A can use the resource more productively than B, A will end up 
with it.127 Therefore, many scholars argue, in a real world full 
of transaction costs that can impede bargaining, it often makes 
sense to "mimic the market" 128 and assign legal rights to the 
highest-valued user in the first instance. This is a core insight of 
Law and Economics. 
Yet the Law and Economics argument largely depends 
on there being a stable highest-valued user.129 The injunction to 
"seek efficiency by mimicking the perfect market" only makes 
normative sense if the perfect market allocation is a constant. If 
the allocation of rights significantly affects the monetary 
valuation that parties place on a resource, then there may be no 
stable economic reality for the law to seek to mimic. 
There is indeed a rare class of goods which lack this 
stability. These are the precious, personal, irreplaceable, crucial 
goods one thinks of as "priceless." Examples are many: the 
Dead Sea Scrolls; family heirlooms; one's children; one's 
health; one's reputation; one's peace of mind. The monetary 
value a person places on one of these goods may well depend on 
126 
127 
128 
129 
For a dramatic hypothetical example, see Alfred C. YEN, "Restoring the 
Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession", (1990) 51 Ohio St. L.J. 
491, 518-519 ("flip flop" of rights). 
See R. H. COASE, loc. cit., note 83. 
See, e.g., G. CALABRESI & A. D. MELAMED, loc. cit., note 61, for a 
classic explanation of market-mimicry. 
For further exploration, and for citation to relevant literature, see E. 
HOFFMAN & M. SPITZER, loc. cit., note 125. 
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whether the person has a legal entitlement to it (whether she 
"owns" it) or whether she must purchase it. 
Consider health, for example. It is plausible that most 
people would be unwilling to sell their organs at any price, so 
that Jane Smith might turn down an offer of five million dollars 
from Billionaire X for one of her kidneys. Similarly, if Jane 
Smith has kidney failure and one of her dying relatives wills her 
a healthy kidney, she might well be unwilling to take the 
billionaire's five million dollars in exchange for her entitlement 
to it. If so, Jane Smith looks like the kidney's "highest-valued 
user." 
But should she have no entitlement to the kidney from 
the recently-deceased person (perhaps because the relevant 
jurisdiction does not recognize such bequests as enforceable), 
Jane Smith's own budget and health insurance will place a limit 
on how much she can spend pursuing the transplant. It is highly 
unlikely she will be able to outbid Billionaire X for the kidney. 
If so, Billionaire X will appear to be the "highest-valued user." 
One can draw from such a pattern no reliable information about 
whether the resource has its highest value in the hands of the 
billionaire or Jane Smith. Tiris phenomenon might be called the 
"pricelessness effect," and its presence may be one reason why 
our society resists giving private ownership in body parts and 
other items that are "priceless" in this sense. 
The pricelessness effect is a subset of the category that 
economists call "endowment effects" which in turn is related to 
wealth effects: since assigning an entitlement to someone makes 
that person wealthier, it can affect the valuation the person puts 
on resources. Often a person's "willingness to buy" price will 
differ significantly from the price at which she is "willing to 
sell".130 Many people hedge the Coase Theorem by noting it 
does not apply when significant wealth or endowment effects 
are present. But usually the wealth or endowment effect is so 
minor that it does not impair the reliability of using a market 
mimicry approach to model efficiency.131 
130 
131 
Experimental evidence on this point has been collected by Matthew Spitzer 
and others. 
The impact of endowment or wealth effects is sometimes exaggerated. See R. 
H. COASE, "Notes on the Problem of Social Cost", loc. cit., note 110, at 170-
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The "pricelessness effect" deserves having its own name 
precisely because the subcategory of effects it denotes are likely 
to be significant. The "pricelessness effect" comes into play 
when the entitlement at issue pertains to a good that (1) an 
individual or group values very highly and (2) which is virtually 
irreplaceable, and (3) when it is the allocation of that very 
good132 which is at issue. As to such items, the initial placement 
of the entitlement is likely to have a sharp effect on the price 
and allocation of the resource, even in the absence of 
transaction costs. 
In cases of parody or criticism - both areas where "fair 
use" treatment tends to be awarded to defendants - reputation 
may be at issue. To many, reputation is priceless in the sense we 
have been discussing. For example, a novelist who fears that a 
journalist will use extensive quotations from her book to bolster 
a hostile review will be most unlikely to sell the journalist a 
license to copy those quotations - regardless of the price 
offered. But that does not mean the author's preference is the 
"highest-valued use" in any meaningful sense, since that same 
author may be unable to buy silence if the law gives the 
journalist a "fair use" liberty right to publish. A similar analysis 
can be made of parody: since most people intensely dislike 
being ridiculed, the legal right may determine where the 
highest-valued use lies.133 In such cases, the market is nearly 
132 
133 
174 (discussing arguments re the presumed effect of changes in legal position 
on the distribution of wealth and on the allocation of resources). 
Professor Coase argues that the impact of wealth effects can be overstated 
because, among other things, if the legal rules are known in advance, the 
prices of applicable resources will likely alter in a way that minimizes such 
effects; in addition, he suggests, contractual provision for contingencies may 
be available to mitigate some changes in legal rules. See id., at 157. See also 
id., at 170-174. Neither of these devices are likely to eliminate the wealth 
effect - here upricelessness" - in the context of authorial suppression of 
embarrassing criticism, however. 
That is, while I predict that the law's assignment of rights in organs is likely to 
have a distinct effect on a kidney's allocation, it is a more complex question 
whether the law's assignment of rights in organs will have much of an effect 
on the allocation of other resources. 
These points are also explored in W. J. GORDON, "Private Censorship", Joe. 
cit., note 1, at 1042-1043; also see W. J. GORDON, "Fair Use as Market 
Failure", loc. cit., note 34, at 1632-1636 (anti-dissemination motives). 
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useless as a guide134, and formal deference to owners' market 
powers is inappropriate. 
For example, assume A is a novelist, a copyright owner 
who has an entitlement not to license and who is otherwise 
financially comfortable; she has perhaps $ 4 000 in the bank and 
a two-year old car and a prospect of steady royalties. A may be 
tempted by B's offer of, say, $ 10 000 for a license to use her 
work, but she can afford to say no without altering her lifestyle. 
If B's project is an ordinary commercial project and A will not 
be sacrificing more than $ 10 000 from foregoing alternative 
uses of the work, she will probably license. (It might also 
happen that B's project would not require an exclusive license 
and would not otherwise interfere with A's other licensing 
opportunities. If so, granting B permission to go forward would 
have no opportunity cost at all for A. She would be even more 
likely to license such a use.) However, if B's project is hostile 
toward A's work, A may well refuse the license, either to 
protect her long-term economic interest (which may be a mere 
pecuniary loss, remember), her aesthetic reputation, or her 
feelings. 
If however the law gave novelist A no entitlement to 
prevent B's use, then she would have to persuade B not to 
publish (cf., blackmail payments.) The most she could offer B 
to persuade B not to make the critical use planned is the amount 
in her bank account, plus whatever she could sell her car for, 
plus whatever she could borrow on the strength of her expected 
royalty stream. The total may well be less than $ 10 000, and A 
will probably demand a price in excess of $ 10 000. Give A the 
entitlement and the highest-valued use of the contested 
expression is in her hands; give B the entitlement and the 
highest-valued use is in that licensee's hands. The locus of the 
"highest-valued use" has shifted as a result of where the law 
places its entitlement. 
134 However, if the market were to yield the same result under either allocation of 
the legal right, then that result could be used as a guide at least to where lies 
the highest economic value (that is, value as measured by ability and 
willingness to pay). 
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In such cases, looking to the results of consensual 
transactions will not give us any information about who 
"should" have the right. 
Another way to put the point is this:135 Economics is 
sometimes used as a normative guide for good social policy. 
When it is used in this fashion, its primary claim to legitimacy 
stems from the links between economics and utilitarianism.136 
The more that income distribution restricts the expression of 
individuals' preferences, the more shaky the link between 
economics and utility becomes. This linkage has the potential 
for completely breaking down in cases of "pricelessness." 
Though in such cases the parties' preferences may remain 
constant, both in their objects and in their intensity, a shift in 
who owns the entitlement may effectively disable one of those 
parties from effectuating that preference. Thus a legal regime 
that is committed (even in part) to utilitarian consequentialism 
would be unwise to rely upon a money-bound market model for 
normative guidance in cases of pricelessness. 
In sum, refusing to allow a copyright owner to suppress 
a hostile use of the copyrighted work, in a case where the 
"pricelessness effect" is likely to make a determinative 
difference, does not necessarily contravene economic principles. 
In such an instance, it is appropriate for even an economically-
oriented court to refuse to defer to the copyright owner, and 
instead make an individualized weighing of how enforcing the 
copyright in the given instance would affect welfare, and any 
other relevant consequentialist or nonconsequentialist policies. 
Conclusion 
This essay has examined the dynamics behind the key 
systemic choice made by copyright law, which is to reverse the 
presumption of Restitution law that people who refrain from 
135 
136 
I am indebted here to Alan Feld. 
lbis belief is rather controversial. See, e.g., such classic sources on the debate 
as the "Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern", (1980) 8 Hofstra L. 
Rev. 485 and Richard A. POSNER, The Economics of Justice (1987) for 
further discussion of the question of whether utilitarianism and economics are 
truly linked in this way. 
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crossing others' tangible boundaries are free to take advantage 
of each other's labor. In intellectual property law, this 
presumptive freedom is replaced by a duty not to copy. Such a 
duty impels potential copyists to identify themselves and seek 
contracts with authors and other creators. In this way, the 
authors are given monetary incentives to continue creating, and 
works are disseminated to the public. However, all this comes at 
a significant price: some people will not have access to works 
for which they would be willing to pay the marginal cost of 
production. This loss of access is particularly significant 
because the works may not be simply fungible goods, but may 
be irreplaceable, unique, and important artifacts crucial to 
comprehending and participating in a culture. 
In order to keep access open to the most important 
cultural components, copyright law allows judges to declare that 
something constitutes an "idea" and is therefore not ownable. 
This flexible if muddy concept keeps the private property 
system permeable to the society's changing preferences 
regarding commodification. 
"Ideas" are not ownable at all. But some cultural 
artifacts must be owned, if authors are to have incentives in a 
world without extensive subsidy. Given the high costs of an 
erroneous judgment to privatize, U.S. copyright law provides, 
inter alia, two standards that provide liberty, particularly to 
members of the public who make creative use of others' 
copyrighted work. These two standards are "substantial 
similarity" and "fair use." Both allow some copying of 
expression, particularly by persons who add a great deal of their 
own talents to what has been copied, transforming the originals. 
Canada's treatment of certain transformative users -
namely, parodists - is significantly different from that of the 
U.S. Many explanations present themselves. One is the United 
States' romance with free speech. We value the iconoclast more 
than do most nations.137 But another obvious explanation is that 
137 Steven H. SHIFFRIN, The First Amendment, Democracy and Romance, 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1990. 
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in each country copyright may serve a different purpose. In the 
U.S., the Constitution explicitly grants Congress power to pass 
copyright and patent laws to serve a public purpose, namely, 
furthering of the "progress of science and the useful arts. "138 
Canada's copyright law may follow more of a continental 
model, in which authors' rights stand on their own as a valid 
reason for copyright. Given Canada's dual heritage, from 
England and France, it seems likely that Canada would be more 
inclined than would the U.S. toward the French traditions of 
honoring the droit d'auteur.139 
But to the extent Canada is aiming at maximizing public 
benefit, and to the extent that economics is a reliable guide to 
that benefit, this essay has suggested that an automatic 
deference to authors over parodists cannot be justified. 
138 
139 
U. S. Const Art I, cl. 8. 
I have suggested elsewhere that even an "authors' rights" approach would 
yield far less protection to authors than do current copyright statutes, see W. J. 
GORDON, "Property Right in Self-Expression", toe. cit., note 54. 
Admittedly, in that essay I was operating out of an Scottish/English "natural 
rights" tradition rather than a Continental one. 
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